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Commander, Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC) is 
concerned with the delivery of high priority material, ordnance, and passengers to U.S. 
Navy ships due to a very large operations area and limited Combat Logistics Force (CLF) 
assets.  High-speed vessels (HSVs) may have the potential to improve the delivery of 
these materials when used to complement existing logistics shuttle ships.  This thesis 
quantifies current levels of traditional naval logistics support and provides comparison to 
HSV-based alternatives in various scenarios.  The CLF Scenario Analysis Tool 
(CLFSAT), a newly developed discrete event simulation model of naval logistics support, 
performs the analysis.  Given a scenario depicting combatant movements and operations, 
CLFSAT provides insight into the comparative performance of different supporting naval 
logistics force structures. 
This analysis determines that HSVs can be effective logistics platforms in specific 
scenarios when distributing high priority material, ordnance, and stores.  HSVs are very 
effective in small theaters with short transit distances, but for larger theaters, their 
effectiveness is inversely proportional to distance from the Forward Logistics Site.  
Regardless of theater size, HSVs show significant improvements in theater distribution of 
“low density, high priority” cargo, such as precision guided munitions (PGMs) or critical 






































The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated.  Any application of these programs without 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Commander, Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC) is 
significantly concerned with the delivery of high priority material, ordnance, and 
passengers to U.S. Navy ships operating in 7th Fleet.  COMLOGWESTPAC considers the 
in-theater portion of the distribution process for these materials to be unacceptably 
lengthy as it relies on delivery over the “last mile” via Combat Logistics Force (CLF) 
shuttle ship cycles.  This delay is perceived as particularly large when compared to the 
robust and rapid logistics support provided in 5th Fleet during Operations Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Unfortunately, the tyranny of distance and 
pure geographic nature of the theaters makes the desired 5th Fleet service levels 
unobtainable in 7th Fleet with the current quantities of CLF assets available.  As the Navy 
is unlikely to increase its force structure of large, expensive CLF ships to cope with the 
7th Fleet problem, it must accept reduced logistics service levels or find a more affordable 
option to improve them.  High-speed vessels (HSVs), smaller and less expensive than 
current CLF ships, may improve the delivery of priority material, ordnance, and 
passengers when used to complement existing CLF shuttle ships in 7th Fleet. 
This thesis develops the CLF Scenario Analysis Tool (CLFSAT), a discrete event 
simulation model of naval logistics support.  Given a scenario depicting combatant 
movements and operations, CLFSAT provides insight into the performance of different 
supporting naval logistics force structures.  The simulation is used to determine whether 
addition of HSVs in a logistics role significantly improves customer service levels for 
combatant ships in the 7th Fleet Theater of Operations.  The analysis specifically 
examines distribution of “low density, high-priority” material, in terms of critical repair 
parts, and precision guided munitions (PGMs). 
A hypothetical Major Combat Operation (MCO) in Korea forms the basis for two 
analyzed scenarios.  The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) and forces available in May 2005 
inform combatant availability and resulting operations.  The first scenario assumes 
availability of preferred Forward Logistics Sites in Japan.  CLFSAT quantifies logistics 
 xxii
performance differences between a base case using current CLF force structure and an 
excursion adding two HSVs.  Results from this comparison suggest a second excursion, 
which includes the two HSVs while reducing the current CLF force structure.  The 
second scenario hypothesizes a North Korean nuclear blackmail of Japan, forcing the 
withdrawal of access to Japanese logistics ports.  The closest assured Forward Logistics 
Site is then Guam, at 1800-plus nautical miles.  CLFSAT determines a new baseline, 
which has a larger current CLF force structure due to the increased distances.  It then 
quantifies logistics performance differences between that baseline and an excursion 
adding two HSVs. 
Results indicate that HSVs can be effective logistics platforms in specific 
scenarios with limited tasks.  They display effectiveness in the distribution of high 
priority material, ordnance, and stores.  These are either required less often and in smaller 
quantities than other commodities, or have a time component that drives the need for 
rapid delivery.  HSVs are very effective at supplying these commodities in small theaters 
with short transit distances, but for larger theaters, their effectiveness is inversely 
proportional to the distance from the Forward Logistics Site (FLS).  In these small 
theaters with a nearby FLS, as around Korea with close support in Japan, HSVs allow the 
naval logistics system to “touch” each customer every 36-48 hours.  Additionally, their 
high-speed gives HSVs “virtual capacity”, allowing them to act in place of some larger 
CLF shuttle ships, such as T-AEs, T-AFSs, or T-AKEs.  This commodity resupply 
capability evaporates with increasing distance from the FLS. 
The niche mission where HSVs appear most effective is theater distribution of 
“low density, high priority” cargo; whether that cargo is precision guided munitions 
(PGMs), critical repair parts, or people should not matter.  This holds true in small 
theaters (e.g., Korea or the Arabian Gulf), where specifically tasked HSVs can deliver 
material up to ten times faster than current CLF, and in larger theaters, where up to four 
times faster is still possible.  This area of “customer service”, of the most concern to 
COMLOGWESTPAC, is also the area that shows the most benefit from HSVs.  The 
improvements gained from HSVs should be the most apparent for cargos too large for 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SEVENTH FLEET OPERATIONS 
 
Commander, Logistics Group, Western Pacific (COMLOGWESTPAC) is 
significantly concerned with the delivery of high priority material, ordnance, and 
passengers to Carrier Strike Group (CSG) escort ships and all Expeditionary Strike Group 
(ESG) ships.  COMLOGWESTPAC, operationally known as Commander, Task Force 73 
(CTF 73), is the U.S. 7th Fleet's principal logistics agent for Southeast Asia.  The 
command plans the resupply of food, ordnance, fuel and repair parts for U.S. Navy ships 
deployed to the 7th Fleet area of operations.  This area of responsibility (AOR), illustrated 
in Figure 1 below, includes over 52 million square miles of the Pacific and Indian Oceans 
-- stretching from the International Date Line in the mid-Pacific to the east coast of 
Africa and from the Kuril Islands in the north to the Antarctic in the south [Ref. 1].  
Current COMLOGWESTPAC logistics operations and plans rely on assigned Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF) shuttle ships to deliver high priority material, ordnance, and 
passengers to the customer ships.  These CLF shuttles regularly cycle between loading 
cargo in logistics shuttle ports and delivering that cargo to customer ships via underway 
replenishment (UNREP).  The delay between a customer’s request for high priority 
material and its delivery onboard is called Customer Wait Time (CWT).  
COMLOGWESTPAC considers the portion of CWT under their control to be 
unacceptably lengthy as it relies on delivery over the “last mile” via these CLF shuttle 
ship cycles.  This delay is perceived as particularly large when compared to the robust 
and rapid logistics support provided in 5th Fleet during Operations Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
The impetus for perceived disparities in naval logistics support between the fleets 
is the recent profusion of operations based in the 5th Fleet Theater.  Twenty years of near 
continuous naval operations in the 5th Fleet region, including four major operations, 
Operations Earnest Will/Praying Mantis, Desert Storm (ODS), Enduring Freedom (OEF), 
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and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), have created somewhat unrealistic expectations of robust naval 








Figure 1.   7th Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR) with key logistics ports 
 
 
1. 5th Fleet versus 7th Fleet Logistics Support 
Geographic factors and the nature of the support structure in 5th Fleet make any 
comparisons with the rest of the world specious.  The 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility 
(AOR) covers approximately 6.4 million square miles compared with 52 million square 
miles for 7th Fleet.  Amplifying this scale difference, most 5th Fleet operations occur very 
close to logistics support ports.  The majority of operations occur in the Arabian Gulf 
with support from Bahrain and Jebel Ali (never more than 200 nautical miles), followed 
by the Red Sea with support from Djibouti and Jeddah (never more than 400 nautical 
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miles), and the Northern Arabian Sea with close access to Fujairah (usually less than 500 
nautical miles).  These relatively short distances are matched in 7th Fleet only in the 
operations areas around Korea and Japan, while in the rest of the theater replenishments 
can easily be more than 1000 miles from logistics ports. 
The “small lake” effect of the shorter distances in 5th Fleet allows not only a rapid 
turnaround of the relatively slow CLF shuttle ships, but extensive use of logistics air 
assets for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) services via C-2s and Vertical Onboard 
Delivery (VOD) services via helicopters.  For this purpose, 5th Fleet has organic H-3, H-
53 and MH-60S logistics helicopters, C-2 CODs, and C-130 transports.  These air assets 
allow next-day service for high priority material and passengers, contributing to the 
perception of fast service and short CWTs in 5th Fleet.  7th Fleet has no equivalent organic 
air assets, nor would they be able to use them in the majority of their AOR due to 
excessive ranges. 
Differences in theater naval logistics support schemes also affect the frequency of 
replenishment.  5th Fleet regularly strips the CLF station ships from the Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSGs) to be used as shuttle ships.  This increases the number of shuttle ships 
available, and thus reduces the shuttle cycle times.  Given the longer transit distances in 
the 7th Fleet AOR, stripping the station ships from the CSGs is infeasible due to the long 
shuttle cycles, though it could be possible in the relatively small operations area around 
Korea and Japan. 
  
2. Naval Logistics Support during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
In addition to the pure theater differences, the nature of the operations in 5th Fleet 
contributes to the perception of reduced logistics support in 7th Fleet.  The large 
percentage of U.S. Naval forces that participated in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) established precedents for naval logistics support.  
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has analyzed CLF performance in both of these 
operations extensively, but only the portions of those reports pertaining to delivery of 
high priority material, passengers, and ordnance is relevant to this analysis [Ref. 2 & 3].  
In 5th Fleet, where both OEF and OIF took place, high priority material and passengers 
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are usually delivered by COD or VOD, if available; otherwise they must be transported 
on a CLF lift of opportunity and delivered via UNREP.  One method of providing 
visibility into the level of customer service provided is to look at the number of days 
between replenishments for the customer ships.  This “customer-centric” measure is 
sometimes incorrectly called cycle time, which more accurately describes the “CLF 
centric” time required for a CLF ship to shuttle from a logistics port to customer and 
back.  CNA categorized this OEF data by customer ship type and examined it in two 
ways: days between replenishment type (COD, VOD, or Replenishment at Sea (RAS)) as 
presented in Table 1, and days between specific commodity replenishments (Dry Stores, 
Fuel, or Ordnance) as presented in Table 2. 
 
Hull Type COD VOD RAS 
CV/CVN 0.8 2.6 3.0 
Amphibs - 11.3 4.6 
CG - 8.0 3.6 
DD/DDG - 6.2 3.9 
FFG - 8.3 3.2 
Table 1. OEF: Average number of days between specific replenishment events 
by customer type, 8/1/01 – 3/31/02. [From Ref. 2] 
 
 
Hull Type Dry Stores Fuel Ordnance 
CV 3.8 4.2 11.0 
CVN 3.8 6.5 7.4 
Amphibs 5.3 8.2 32.3 
CG 5.1 5.1 31.7 
DD/DDG 6.6 4.9 39.1 
FFG 5.9 4.6 52.8 
Table 2. OEF: Average number of days between replenishment events by 




Unfortunately, CNA aggregated these numbers in Table 1 and 2 over an eight-
month period covering three distinctly different operational profiles: Pre-September 11th, 
Pre-OEF, and OEF.  This wide variance in naval operations throughout the period would 
have a big effect on these frequency numbers, so it is not clear how valid they might be 
without segregating them into the three operational profiles.  For example, the average 
number of days between ordnance replenishments from Table 2 is highly suspect, given 
that the first two periods, Pre-September 11th and Pre-OEF, do not involve ordnance 
expenditure, so would not require ordnance replenishment.  So, short of eliminating these 
periods from the calculation of the averages, one quarter of the total time period without 
ordnance replenishments would have a large impact on the average values. 
Despite the high aggregation of the OEF data, the same granularity is not even 
available for OIF.  The only OIF customer service or replenishment frequency data 
available is for aircraft carriers.  The carriers on the Mediterranean Station (6th Fleet not 
5th) averaged UNREPs every 2.9 days, while those in the Arabian Gulf averaged 
UNREPs every 3.6 days.  For the Arabian Gulf, this is slightly less often than in OEF, but 
OIF had a much higher customer to CLF ratio during the peak operations, 5.8 customers 
to 1 CLF, as compared with 3.6 to 1 for OEF. [Refs. 2 and 3] 
These OEF and OIF numbers show at least adequate, or in some cases, excellent 
customer service, but can still be slightly misleading.  From the OEF data, all ship types 
averaged receiving dry stores every 4 to 6 days.  This is well above what is actually 
required for sustainment of combatants, so it is not clear if this was driven by parts 
requirements, or simply provided due to an excess of CLF in 5th Fleet.  When looking 
specifically at high priority material and ordnance, actual performance could be even 
better than shown by the aggregated values in the tables.  For example, the use of 
averages hides the CODs and VODs that handled emergent high priority requirements on 
a same or next-day basis.  As mentioned earlier, this level of rapid service is very often 
possible in 5th Fleet as during OEF and OIF, and rarely possible in 7th Fleet.  In the cases 
when VODs are not possible due to range, customer ships must rely on CLF shuttle ship 
RAS for high priority material delivery.  In 5th Fleet, during both OEF and OIF, RAS was 
available, on average, every 3 to 4 days, which in most cases is still quite rapid.  These 
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low shuttle ship cycle times are very hard to achieve in 7th Fleet, with 8 to 12 days being 
much more likely. 
 
B. HIGH-SPEED VESSELS AS CLF – AN AFFORDABLE OPTION? 
 
The tyranny of distance and nature of the theater makes the desired 5th Fleet 
service levels unobtainable in 7th Fleet with the current quantities of CLF assets available.  
Unfortunately, these traditional CLF ships are large, expensive vessels, and the U.S. 
Navy is on a declining force structure trend imposed by fiscal constraints.  While there 
are current and planned programs to build new replenishment ships, much of current 
dialogue focuses on reducing the number of these large, expensive CLF ships that we buy 
and operate.  The declining force structure trend has forced the majority of recent studies 
to focus on how to improve employment of the existing CLF forces and some of these 
attempts to optimize CLF schedules have grown into a push for global vice theater 
scheduling of CLF assets.  All of these machinations are intended to counteract the 
reduced inventory and procurement numbers, but do not fully answer the 7th Fleet 
tyranny of distance problem.  As the Navy will be constrained by these fiscal realities for 
the foreseeable future, they cannot simply buy more traditional CLF assets to cope with 
the 7th Fleet problem.  The Navy thus has the choice of accepting the reduced logistics 
service levels in 7th Fleet or finding some other less expensive option to improve them. 
High-speed vessels (HSVs) have the potential to provide the desired rapid 
delivery of priority material, ordnance, and passengers when used to complement existing 
CLF shuttle ships in 7th Fleet.  These high-speed vessels (HSVs) have an advanced hull 
form, such as the wave-piercing catamaran, and can transit at high-speeds (30 to 45+ 
knots).  HSVs trade speed and reduced cycle time for a much lower cargo capacity and 
endurance than traditional CLF.  They are also significantly less expensive to procure and 
operate, making them a potential fiscally feasible solution.  Variants of the HSV are 
under consideration to play a large future role in Sea Power 21 and become a key part of 
naval transformation. 
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A HSV designed as a support ship could prove particularly useful in the 7th Fleet 
where VOD services are not available or COD assets are outside practical range from 
shore logistics bases.  Conversely, the short distances in the small operations areas 
around Korea (much like most parts of 5th Fleet) combined with the high speed of the 
HSVs could make them attractive for some very high priority cargos, particularly 
precision guided munitions (PGMs) that may be in short supply.  Given the recent U.S. 
Navy HSV experimentation, COMLOGWESTPAC considers the HSV a potential 
solution to their Customer Wait Time (CWT) issue.  U.S. Pacific Fleet and 7th Fleet agree 
and have assigned COMLOGWESTPAC as the lead agency to conduct a study on the 
HSV’s potential logistics mission and secondary missions supporting operations, 
contingencies, and Operational Plans (OPLANS) in 7th Fleet.  This thesis research is 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS IN THE U.S. NAVY 
 
Modern naval operations and Sea Power 21, the U.S. Navy’s vision for the future, 
are dependent on naval operational logistics for success.  When the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, talks about the Navy, he emphasizes the value of 
persistence: 
One of the things that I have learned over the course of the last year and a 
half is the importance of persistence. When I got this job, I realized I had 
to be able to talk about the Navy, the vision for the Navy, and what our 
mission and task and function were. I can do that for an hour, and I can do 
it for 30 minutes, or 15, or 10. And sometimes I only have 30 seconds. 
The 30-second version is: credible combat power, far corners of the earth, 
sovereignty of the United States of America, anywhere we want to go 
without asking permission. In the aftermath of Afghanistan, I added the P 
word-not just credible combat power, but credible, persistent combat 
power. So persistence is one of my favorite words. [Ref. 4] 
Persistence as a naval capability is reliant on many factors but is not possible 
without a robust naval operational logistics system.  The U.S. Navy is the world’s most 
proficient practitioner of naval operational logistics and has been since developing the 
initial procedures for underway replenishment (UNREP) in 1904.  From the first oiler, 
USS KANAWHA (AO-1), to the newest underway replenishment ship, the USNS 
LEWIS AND CLARK (T-AKE 1), the U.S. Navy remains committed to robust naval 
logistics support.  Throughout the history of U.S. Navy operational logistics, the basic 
support paradigm has remained the same: underway replenishment of combatants by 
large and usually slow auxiliary shuttle ships.  The methods of UNREP have been refined 
and improved with increasing capacities for connected replenishment (CONREP), the 
addition of vertical replenishment (VERTREP) via helicopter, and the introduction of 
Fast Combat Support station ships (AOEs), but the basic support paradigm remains 
relatively static.  Sea Power 21 brings some new focus onto this area, mainly in the Sea 
Basing concepts.  To support these concepts, engineers are significantly increasing 
CONREP capacities to handle significantly heavier loads and small shipping containers. 
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Despite these marginal improvements, current and future CLF plans rely on 
building and using more of the same types of replenishment ships that we have been 
using for 40 years.  The Navy’s fiscal limitations and declining force structure trend 
provides impetus to investigate alternative methods that bear little resemblance to 
traditional CLF operations.  This study for COMLOGWESTPAC on the potential of 
HSVs is one such alternative method. 
 
B. COMMERCIAL HIGH-SPEED VESSELS 
 
The commercial market for high-speed ferries (HSFs) drives the development of 
HSVs.  Through the 1980s, the commercial HSF industry was a small niche business 
dominated by Norway with a hybrid mono-hull hydrofoil design known as the 
asymmetric catamaran.  Technological advances in aluminum shipbuilding and water jet 
propulsion in the 1980s allowed the development of the symmetric catamaran, which 
springboarded the rapid rise of the HSF industry and fostered new dominance by 
Australian Shipbuilders, Incat and Austal.  By 1990, this new technology had developed 
vessels capable of carrying 449 passengers at speeds in excess of 35 knots [Ref. 6].  
Continued improvement in engine and hull-technology has allowed larger and faster 
vessels carrying heavier loads shifting much of the business from passenger-only to 
combined passenger and car ferries.  In 1997, the CAT LINK V, a wave-piercing 
catamaran designed and built by Incat of Australia crossed the Atlantic, while light-
loaded, at an average speed of 41.28 knots.  Making this feat more remarkable is the 
relatively large size of the vessel: the 34,000 horsepower ferry is 91.3 meters length 
overall and has the capacity to carry 800 passengers and 200 cars, although at lower 
speeds. 
The high-speed of HSFs given their large size is not without a price.  The 
combination of these factors requires high horsepower engines with high power-to-
weight ratios.  Medium and high-speed turbo-charged diesels dominate the HSF industry 
as they provide acceptable speed and are more fuel-efficient.  Gas turbines have a higher 
power-to-weight ratio which leads to faster top speeds with more cargo but also worse 
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fuel economy. [Ref. 7]  The “iron triangle” of balancing cargo and fuel weight (payload) 
with range and speed requirements is a continuous and critical process for all HSFs.  
Gaining additional range and/or speed, requires additional fuel, thus directly reducing 
cargo capacity.  The range of the ferries varies with the amount of cargo versus fuel load 
as described in Figure 2 below.  As an example, an Incat 98-meter vessel, at 35 knots, can 
carry 720 tons of cargo 200NM, but by limiting cargo to 270 tons, can achieve ranges of 
3000NM.  The capacities for cargo reflect crew, passengers, cargo, water, etc. [Ref. 6] 
 
Figure 2.   Incat Evolution 10B 98m Platform: Cargo Capability vs. Fuel Load at 
100% MCR and Full Displacement [From Ref. 6] 
 
Today, Incat’s fast wave-piercing catamaran and Austal’s not nearly as fast, but 
more stable, forward Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) catamaran designs 
dominate the HSF industry.  Both designs result in a broad platform with a large amount 
of internal deck space for vehicles and cargo and are sometimes referred to as RO/PAX 
vessels, for Roll-On/Roll-Off and Passenger.  While there are other smaller HSF builders 
in Japan and Norway, as well as other companies in Europe and the U.S. experimenting 
with trimarans, pentamarans, and new mono-hull designs, the two Australian companies 
have drawn the military interest in HSVs. 
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C. MILITARY USE OF HIGH-SPEED VESSELS 
 
1. HMAS JERVIS BAY 
In 1999, the Royal Australian Navy signed a two-year lease for an Incat 86m 
HSF, the HMAS JERVIS BAY, to fill an amphibious lift shortfall caused by the 
unavailability of two recently purchased former U.S. tank landing ships (LSTs) still 
undergoing conversions.  The HMAS JERVIS BAY, pictured in Figure 3, is a completely 
commercial design; the only military modifications were a gray paint scheme and slightly 
strengthened lower decks.  High levels of automation allowed operation and loading of 
the ship by a 25-person Navy crew. 
The first tasking for the JERVIS BAY was supporting Australia’s contribution to 
the humanitarian operations in East Timor.  On her first journey from Darwin, Australia 
to Dili, East Timor, she carried 572 soldiers and their equipment 430 nautical miles in 
less than 12 hours, sustaining speeds over 40 knots.  This was the first military operation 
conducted by a HSF, soon to be relabeled by the military as a high-speed vessel (HSV).  
Over the next year, the JERVIS BAY traveled the Darwin to Dili route 74 times, carrying 
supplies, troops, armored personnel carriers, light armored vehicles, trucks, refrigerated 
containers and standard cargo containers.  During these missions, the ship rapidly self-
loaded and self-offloaded at austere ports and even performed at-sea transfers to landing 
craft.  [Ref. 6] 
The United States’ first introduction to military HSV use occurred during an inter-
operability exercise between JERVIS BAY and the TARAWA Amphibious Ready Group 
(ARG) in September 2000.  During the exercise, JERVIS BAY loaded U.S. Marines and 
U.S. Navy SEALs from the ARG at-sea, inserted them into an exercise area, then 
recovered and returned them to the ARG, all while the ARG remained 200 nautical miles 
offshore. [Ref. 6] 
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Figure 3.   HMAS Jervis Bay [From Ref. 9] 
 
2. WestPac Express 
After exposure to JERVIS BAY, III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), based 
in Okinawa, Japan, used Military Sealift Command (MSC) to lease the WestPac Express 
in February 2002 on a time charter.  III MEF uses the 101m Austal HSV, pictured in 
Figure 4, to support lift requirements for training and operations in the Western Pacific 
Region between Okinawa, Guam, Thailand, Korea, and the Japanese mainland.  Before 
this lease, III MEF was reliant on U.S. Air Force airlift.  The WestPac Express is capable 
of sustaining 36 knots while transporting 500 dead weight tons (DWT).  In 40 hours, it 
was able to transport 370 Marines and 400 tons of cargo between Okinawa and Guam 
(1200nm).  At the high end, it has transported 970 Marines and 550 tons of equipment in 
a single load from Okinawa to Yokohama (600nm).  To move the same amount via airlift 
would take 14-17 airlift assets spread out over a 14 day period. [Ref. 8]  The 
overwhelming success of the WestPac Express trial led to the signing of a new three-year 
lease by MSC. 
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Figure 4.   WestPac Express [From U.S. Navy] 
 
3. HSV-X1 JOINT VENTURE 
Seeing the potential for increased U.S. military contracts, Incat Australia 
partnered with Bollinger Shipyards to form Incat USA to design and produce HSVs to 
U.S. specifications.  The newly formed company’s first contract in July 2001, was for the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) lease of a 96m wave-piercing catamaran, Incat Hull 
050.  This vessel, originally launched in 1998, was the first of Incat’s 96m class.  TT-
Line (Tasmania) initially operated the vessel as the DEVIL CAT for Bass Strait 
crossings.  It then moved to New Zealand, operated by Fast Cat Ferries to provide service 
across the Cook Strait as the TOP CAT.  This continued until Tranz Rail forced Fast Cat 
Ferries out of business with anti-competitive practices, since prosecuted.  The vessel was 
returned to Incat, where it was modified for military use and renamed by DoD as the 
HSV-X1 JOINT VENTURE to be used for multi-service evaluation and experimentation.  
Incat modified the vessel for military use by adding a helicopter deck, stern quarter 
RO/RO ramp, RHIB deployment gantry crane, full seating and limited rack 
accommodations for 363 troops, crew accommodation, storage facilities, medical 
facilities, long-range fuel tanks, and a C4ISR room.  HSV-X1, pictured in Figure 5, has a 
shallow loaded draft of 12 feet and is capable of self-deployment over 4500 nautical 
miles.  It is able to transport a cargo load of 422 short tons for 1110 nautical miles at an 
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average speed of 35 knots in sea state 3.  Alternatively, it can carry 545 short tons for 600 
nautical miles, also averaging 35 knots in sea state 3. [Ref. 9] 
The Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command split 
experimentation with JOINT VENTURE.  The Army used the vessel to evaluate and 
experiment with concepts related to the transformation to the Objective Force.  The Navy 
used it to test concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Mine Countermeasures, 
and the Marine Corps experimented with Sea Basing concepts.  The experimentation was 
suspended when JOINT VENTURE deployed operationally to the Arabian Gulf for OIF.  
During OIF, JOINT VENTURE performed superbly while operating in the littorals of 
Iraq as an Afloat Forward Staging Base for Navy Special Warfare combatant craft 
operations.  Since this Special Operations use, Army and Marine Corps Forces in Central 
Command used her to support intra-theater lift.  The Army recently bought out the Navy 
share of HSV-X1 and continues to operate the vessel. 
 
Figure 5.   HSV-X1 Joint Venture landing a MH-60S Knighthawk [From U.S. 
Navy] 
 
4. U.S. Army TSV-1X SPEARHEAD 
After one year of operating the JOINT VENTURE, the Army decided that they 
needed another HSV as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD) 
program.  USAV TSV-1X SPEARHEAD is Incat Hull 060, a modified 98m Evolution 
10B wave-piercing catamaran.  Her purpose is to demonstrate and evaluate her ability to 
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perform during specified missions in a theater support role, making sustainment 
deliveries and moving Army pre-positioned supplies and troops.  The Army wants to use 
a fleet of TSV-like vessels to transport units within a theater of operations in hours 
instead of days.  The TSV supports the intra-theater movement portion of the Army’s 
Transformation goal of deploying a combat ready brigade anywhere in the world within 
96 hours, a division in 120 hours and five divisions within 30 days [Ref. 9].  Immediately 
after delivery, SPEARHEAD deployed to Central Command to support OEF and OIF. 
 
Figure 6.   USAV TSV-1X SPEARHEAD Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstrator [From Ref. 9] 
 
5. HSV-2 SWIFT 
Based on the successful experimentation with JOINT VENTURE, the Navy 
acquired their own Incat 98m catamaran, Hull 061, renamed the HSV-2 SWIFT on 15 
August 2003.  Further improvements made to SWIFT include a much larger flight deck 
with two hangers for MH-60S helicopters, an improved crane capable of launching boats 
and unmanned vehicles, a robust Navy communications suite, and an interface system for 
modular payloads.  SWIFT is primarily serving as an interim replacement for the mine 
warfare command and control ship, USS INCHON.  The Navy Warfare Development 
Command is also using SWIFT to continue testing LCS concepts, while the Marine 
Corps is testing Sea Basing concepts.  Since delivery, SWIFT has deployed to West 
Africa & Norway, and tested Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) off South America.  
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In January 2005, SWIFT deployed to South East Asia to support Operation Unified 
Assistance, the humanitarian operation in the wake of the recent tsunami. 
 
Figure 7.   HSV 2 SWIFT with MH-60S Knight Hawk on deck.  Note dual 
hangers [From U.S. Navy] 
 
6. Future Designs 
Incat has designed a longer and wider 112m catamaran intended for military 
applications with several variants possible.  The CNO considered a High-speed Joint 
Command & Control (HJCC) variant fitted out as a joint command post as a replacement 
for existing large command ships.  While this HJCC design was promising, it lost out in 
the competition with traditional combatants for now extremely limited shipbuilding 
funds.  A High-speed Support Ship (HSSS) cargo variant takes advantage of the broader, 
longer platform to provide higher cargo capacities and endurance, roughly 800+ tons at 
3500nm at 35-45 knots.  This variant has a much larger flight deck for two or more 
helicopters and is optimized for a CLF of fast sealift sort of role.  It is the current prime 
candidate for the Joint High-speed Vessel (JHSV) program, run by the Navy, with Army 
and Marine Corps participation.  This thesis uses the HSSS variant of the Incat 112m Sea 
Frame to evaluate HSVs as CLF ships. 
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Figure 8.   Incat 112m High-speed Support Ship with large flight deck [From 
Ref. 9] 
 
7. Sea Basing and the High-Speed Connector (HSC) 
Sea Basing is part of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 vision.  The sea base is intended to 
provide naval forces with the capability to loiter, project, and sustain significant combat 
power from the sea in an anti-access environment.  To make the sea base work, a system 
of high-speed connectors (HSCs) is required to network the sea base to the continental 
United States (CONUS), to advanced bases, and to forces operating ashore.  Within the 
sea base, the connectors will interface with prepositioning ships, commercial and CLF 
shipping, and the assault and strike platforms of the ESG and CSG.  There are three types 
of connectors required: Intertheater to connect CONUS and advanced bases or the sea 
base, Intratheater to move forces from advanced base to sea base and operationally within 
the theater, and Assault/Lighterage connectors to move combat forces ashore [Ref. 10].  
The concept for the Intratheater HSC shares many of the same characteristics as the 
HSVs discussed earlier.  HSV 2 SWIFT actually performs much of the current 
experimentation with HSC concepts.  If DoD procures Intratheater HSCs, they may be a 
completely new design or leverage existing designs, such as the Incat HSVs.  Whichever 
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design, Sea Basing studies indicate that these Intratheater HSCs must be forward based in 
the theater in which they will be employed in order to be available to support the Sea 
Base.  With these Intratheater HSCs deployed in the operational theaters for use in 
wartime, they are potentially untasked in peacetime.  Establishing a potential peacetime 
logistics role for these HSCs, and examing how they could perform in a wartime CLF 
role could provide further justification and support for the Sea Basing concept. 
 
D. EXISTING STUDIES OF HSV USE 
 
1. Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
The ubiquitous Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has done some of the initial 
work in this field.  They have three studies that apply directly: 
 
a. Application of Speed in Naval Vessels 
This study examines the historical uses of speed in the U.S. Navy and 
finds there is no singular case where speed is a dominant ship design characteristic.  
Speed does have value and can provide a significant increase in ship capability when 
combined with other characteristics, such as a useful load-carrying capability.  The 
authors initially focus on speed in combatant ships and make the argument that speed 
placed in the weapons (i.e., missiles) is much more critical.  They also make the point 
that combatant ships spend the majority of their time at their most efficient speeds, 
making fuel use the dominant driver.  While this is a valid finding for combatants, it has 
much less application to logistics operations where payload capacity divided by transit 
and cycle times directly drive sustainability.  If high-speed is the only thing that makes 
the sustainment possible, then high-speed will be used despite the inefficiency and high 
fuel consumption required if it can satisfy the payload requirements.  The authors provide 
support for this by examining CLF operations in 5th Fleet during OEF and finding that the 
shuttle ships increasingly had to proceed at maximum speed to meet requirements.  They 
also mention that for sea basing and intratheater movements, the combination of speed, 
lift capacity, and equipment handling capabilities combine to make a militarily significant 
capability and that experimentation with HSVs has shown that “speed clearly helps”.  
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CNA makes the final point that the availability of intermediate support bases for loading 
CLF ships is decreasing, due mostly to force protection concerns.  This results in the 
distances traveled by shuttle ships increasing, which drives a requirement for more 
shuttle ships or ones with increased speed [Ref. 11].  Alternatively, a HSV with a large 
fuel load (thus range) and small payload might fill a niche requirement if adequate 
payload throughput could be achieved. 
 
b. Quicklook Investigation of a High-speed Vessel’s Utility as a 
Combat Logistics Force Ship 
The Director, Strategic Mobility and Combat Logistics Division (N42), in 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) asked CNA to assess alternative 
concepts for CLF ship deployments.  This quicklook study answers that tasking by 
investigating HSV’s utility as an alternative CLF platform delivering logistics products—
fuel, ammunition, and/or dry stores—to customer ships.  To perform this analysis, CNA 
used two notional HSVs. The current technology HSV-600 has a cargo payload of 600 
tons, a range of 1,000 nm, and a full-load speed of 35 knots.  The future technology 
HSV-1250 has a cargo payload of 1,250 tons, a range of 3,000nm, and a full-load speed 
of 40 knots.  The study had the following main findings: 
The fuel capacity of both notional HSVs is too small for refueling task 
force/unit customers. Thus, they are ineffective as wet product ships.  
Because customer ships normally require stores replenishment only once 
every 10 to 15+ days, the speed advantage of an HSV is of limited value 
in this role … Our findings indicate that the best use of the HSV as a 
logistics resupply ship is as a rearming vessel for a CVBG or a DD(X) under 
wartime conditions.  These HSVs might augment the CLF ships required in 
peacetime for this specific wartime need. Our investigation did not reveal a 
peacetime mission for these HSVs. [Ref. 12] 
CNA’s finding that HSVs are ineffective as wet product ships informs this 
thesis analysis, which will only study dry cargos for HSVs. 
 
c. At-Sea Experimentation with Joint Venture, October 2001 
through September 2002 
The Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) asked CNA to help 
document the results of at-sea experimentation with JOINT VENTURE over a one-year 
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period.  The study focused on how the commercial technologies of the HSV might be 
useful for naval applications.  Findings relevant to this thesis are included below: 
• HSVs have sufficient range to shift quickly between theaters in an 
independent movement or to deploy with a CSG or ESG.  In practice, such 
transfers will probably require that the ship carry minimal cargo. 
• HSVs are competitive with air transport for intra-theater lift of ground 
units and their equipment. 
• HSVs demonstrated efficient load and off-load of rolling stock, but 
slightly less efficient for containers, palletized break-bulk cargo, and 
helicopters.  The loading process could be further engineered for speed. 
• JOINT VENTURE demonstrated the ability to support daytime takeoff 
and landing of several SH-60 and CH-46 series helicopters.  The 
helicopter deck was used to transfer passengers and to move small 
amounts of cargo.  The lack of a helicopter refueling system and the need 
to move cargo to and from the flight deck by hand, limited the usefulness 
of JOINT VENTURE as a surrogate for testing HSV helicopter support 
concepts.  [Note: Some of these issues are corrected in HSV 2 SWIFT] 
• In a fully loaded condition, operations by JOINT VENTURE were 
unaffected in seas up to a significant wave height of approximately 8 feet.  
In higher seas, significant amounts of slamming occurred when JOINT 
VENTURE headed into the waves at speeds in excess of 10–15 knots.  It 
is possible that a redesign of the ship could either mitigate the impact of 
slamming or produce a larger regime of unrestricted operations. 
• HSVs demonstrated the ability to use austere ports with depths as shallow 
as 18 feet and restricted maneuvering room. 
• JOINT VENTURE demonstrated the ability to conduct periodic operations 
at sea for periods of up to one week.  Factors limiting the endurance of the 
test-bed ship include the ship’s small crew size and a requirement to visit 
port to take on fuel or supplies, and maintenance requirements. [Ref. 13] 
 
These findings indicate that while HSVs demonstrate some potential as 
logistics assets, some re-design and improvements are required to realize that potential.  
To that end, some limitations revealed by HSV-X1 are addressed in HSV 2 SWIFT or in 
the design for the 112m platform. 
 
2. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Two Naval Postgraduate School theses apply to HSVs and are summarized 
below: 
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a. The Costs and Benefits of High-speed Vessels Relative to 
Traditional C-17 Military Airlift 
III MEF’s anecdotal experience with WestPac Express is positive, but 
MSC requires solid analysis to backup any future procurement actions based on that 
experience.  Thomas Strenge and Kevin Ralston developed their MBA Professional 
Report as a cost-benefit analysis for MSC to determine if the purchase or lease of more 
HSVs is warranted.  In their analysis, they compare WestPac Express data to the closest 
alternative, Air Force C-17s.  As mentioned above, given demonstrated capability to 
reduce airlift requirements significantly, the HSVs compare very well.  Strenge and 
Ralston conclude that MSC should institutionalize HSV service within major theaters of 
operation and argue that reducing the procurement of Air Force C-17s by two aircraft 
would fund it sufficiently. Unfortunately, this analysis is completely cost-based and only 
compares HSVs to airlift.  This study did not evaluate suitability and performance of the 
HSV relative to CLF and other sealift.  [Ref. 8] 
 
b. Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship 
The Navy is moving forward on the development of the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS), an affordable, small, multi-mission ship capable of independent, 
interdependent and integrated operations inside the littorals.  The nature of the mission 
means that the LCS must incorporate endurance, speed, payload capacity, sea-keeping, 
shallow draft, and mission reconfigurability into a small ship design, a very problematic 
task.  David Rudko analyzes the effect of speed, displacement and significant wave 
height on LCS fuel consumption and endurance and resulting impacts on LCS logistics.  
His study of the LCS is not directly related to this thesis, but he uses data from HSV-X1 
JOINT VENTURE as a LCS surrogate, so some of the findings apply.  His primary 
finding is that speed, displacement, and significant wave height all result in considerable 
increases in fuel consumption, and as a result, severely limit LCS (or HSV) endurance.  
The most relevant finding for this study is the importance of the iron triangle: the ship 
can achieve high-speeds, but only at the expense of range and payload capacity.  This 
finding is an integral property of all HSVs and therefore a necessary characteristic of any 
model of them. [Ref. 14] 
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E. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The primary objective of CTF73 is to provide better logistics support to its 
customers.  In support of that objective, this thesis will quantify current levels of 
traditional logistics support and provide comparison to some HSV-based alternatives.  It 
will determine whether addition of logistics support optimized HSVs to provide high-
speed delivery of priority material, ordnance, and passengers significantly improves 
customer service levels for combatant ships in the 7th Fleet Theater of Operations.  In the 
area of high-priority ordnance, this thesis will also explore the capabilities and 
performance of HSVs in the niche area of delivery of “low density” precision guided 
munitions (PGMs).  During any large-scale conflict, operations will consume available 
stocks of PGMs within the theater very quickly.  This requires shipment of PGMs from 
CONUS and a method to distribute them rapidly to the aircraft carriers for immediate 
use. 
This thesis will also briefly address a secondary question concerning survivability 
and risk management in naval logistics.  During the execution of the logistics support 
mission an HSV may be more survivable in a submarine-threat environment than existing 
CLF ships.  While HSVs are not acoustically “stealthy” due to extensive engine noise and 
water jet propulsion, their high-speed makes the submarine pursuit and targeting problem 
very difficult.  Addressing this issue in detail is outside the scope of this thesis.  
However, the analysis to answer the primary research question could provide a limited 
answer by quantifying the reduction of the more vulnerable large CLF ships’ shuttle 
cycle frequency gained by addition of HSVs in a CLF role. 
 
F. SCOPE OF THESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
A general simulation model of naval logistics support is required.  This model is 
the Combat Logistics Force Scenario Analysis Tool (CLFSAT), a discrete event 
simulation (DES) that gives insight into performance of naval logistics in response to 
different peacetime and wartime scenarios.  It serves as an exploratory tool to analyze 
24 
force structure, levels, and employment and their resulting statistical effect on various 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  For any individual scenario, CLFSAT will not and 
cannot predict the exact outcomes of real-world operations, but can compare the relative 
effectiveness of different courses of action. 
To answer the specific research question, the simulation is focused on the 7th Fleet 
Theater and baseline COMLOGWESTPAC scenarios are implemented using traditional 
CLF assets.  CLFSAT runs the scenarios and generates MOEs for evaluation.  HSVs in a 
special CLF shuttle role are then added to the baseline scenarios and new MOEs are 
produced and evaluated as compared to the traditional CLF.  CLFSAT does not explicitly 
model submarine threats, but reduction in CLF shuttle requirements should be apparent in 
the MOEs. 
 
1. JAVA and Object-Oriented Programming 
CLFSAT is implemented in the Java Programming Language, a freely available, 
object-oriented programming (OOP) language.  Walter Savitch, in his textbook on the 
subject, describes OOP as follows: 
Object oriented programming is a programming methodology that views 
any program as a world consisting of objects that interact with each other 
by means of actions.  An object is a program construction that has data 
associated with it and that can perform certain actions.  When the program 
is run, the objects interact with one another in order to accomplish 
whatever the program was designed to do.  The actions performed by 
objects are called methods.  A class is a type or kind of object.  All objects 
in the same class have the same kinds of data and the same methods. [Ref. 
15] 
OOP uses the principles of encapsulation, polymorphism, and inheritance to 
facilitate these interactions.  The details of how objects work internally are hidden from 
the user (encapsulation) who only has to rely on a standard interface (polymorphism) to 
interact with a hierarchy of similar objects (inheritance).  These OOP features make Java 
naturally suited to developing simulations because the Java code has an intuitive 
correspondence with the modeled reality.  This makes simulation development relatively 
straightforward and reduces workload in the development process. 
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Potentially, the most important feature of Java for this application is its 
“portability”.  Java is platform independent, meaning the same code will run without 
modifications on Windows, Solaris, Linux, Macintosh, etc.  It is also freely available, 
which means there are no license requirements to use it.  This is critical if various 
commands intend to use CLFSAT as an analysis tool.  There is no barrier to running the 
compiled tool on NMCI systems. 
 
2. Simkit Discrete Event Simulations 
Another advantage of Java, is it allows the use of Simkit, developed by Professor 
Arnold Buss at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Simkit is a software package for 
implementing Discrete Event Simulation (DES) models in Java.  DES relies on two 
fundamental elements: state variables, which are properties of objects, and events, which 
are objects performing actions, interacting, and changing state variables.  A DES 
simulates the reality of a system by tracking the changes in these state variables over 
time, which can generate statistics for analysis of system performance.  In order for time 
to progress and these events to occur, a DES requires a scheduling engine to govern the 
interactions.  This engine is the Future Event List, a “to do” list of scheduled events.  
Unlike time-step simulations, time only moves forward in a DES when the next event on 
the Event List occurs.  Nothing happens in between events.  In this way, a DES is 
continually updating or changing the Event List and state variables based upon current 
events and time passed. 
Simkit provides a pre-set component based structure for implementing a DES.  It 
has implemented objects that move, sensors to detect them, and statistical packages to 
analyze their interactions.  Through a structure of SimEventListeners, objects can listen 
for other objects to perform specific actions and then take corresponding actions.  This 
allows objects to interact with each other without losing the advantages of OOP.  Another 
structure called a PropertyChangeListener interfaces with the statistical routines to track 
changes in state variables over time.  This allows the construction of robust simulations 




3. Global SeaRoutes Network 
CLFSAT relies on the Global Sea Routes Network to represent the world and 
control how ships move through it.  This network was developed over the span of three 
previous NPS theses by Kevin Borden, Ronaldo Givens, and John Cardillo supported by 
Distinguished Professor Gerald Brown and Associate Professor Matt Carlyle [Refs. 16, 
17, & 18].  In these previous implementations, the network is implemented in the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS), which is particularly inefficient for that 
application, but facilitated their further optimization work within the same system.  To 
function with CLFSAT, the Global SeaRoutes Network is re-implemented in Java. 
The Global SeaRoutes Network is a model of the navigable world sea routes 
required for Navy ships to sail to, in and around traditional operations areas.  The 
network consists of a set of nodes worldwide that are either at-sea waypoints or ports 
with logistics capabilities.  Arcs are specified between adjacent node pairs to allow 
navigation between them on a great circle route or rhumb line route.  Each arc carries a 
“cost” which is the rhumb line distance between the two nodes.  Additionally, some arcs 
are “slow arcs” which force a limited transit speed.  These represent natural chokepoints, 
straits, and canals, such as the Suez Canal or the Malacca Strait.  Figure 9 presents the 
full network and Figure 10 presents a zoomed view of the area around Japan and Korea. 
The Floyd-Warshall “all shortest paths” algorithm is applied to the Global 
SeaRoutes Network to generate the shortest paths between all nodes globally.  When we 
use this resulting network for navigation, a ship at any point in the network can find and 
travel the shortest path to anywhere else in the network.  Surprisingly, relatively few 
nodes are required to represent the majority of the world’s naval operating areas.  The 
algorithms are also flexible enough to handle any additions of desired nodes or arcs if 
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III. THE CLF SCENARIO ANALYSIS TOOL (CLFSAT) AND 
IMPLEMENTED SCENARIOS 
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
The CLF Scenario Analysis Tool (CLFSAT) is a general tool that can answer 
naval logistics related questions for any area of the world under any desired scenario.  
This allows for potential reuse of the tool at the operational fleets (CTF53/63/73), 
Commander Fleet Forces Command, Chief of Naval Operations Staff (Navy Strategic 
Mobility and Combat Logistics - OPNAV N42), and the Combat Logistics Force 
Operational Advisory Group (CLF OAG) at Commander, Naval Surface Group, Pacific 
Northwest (COMNAVSURFGRU PACNORWEST).  To support the Sea Power 21 
vision, the model could be adapted to address Sea Basing issues that rely on some of the 
same core components as pure naval logistics.  CLFSAT’s ability to provide comparative 
performance measures between different courses of action and force levels also allows 
use as an OPLAN logistics-planning tool. 
CLFSAT is a simulation involving “customer” ships that travel around the world 
or within a theater executing scripted actions in accordance with a specified scenario.  
The customer ships consume logistics commodities: Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM or F76), 
Aviation Fuel (JP5 or F44), ordnance, and stores.  They also generate high priority 
requisition requirements through Casualty Reports (CASREPs) in accordance with 
historic rates.  The consumption of these commodities creates requirements for 
replenishment based on established acceptable reserve levels.  CLF ships, Carrier 
Onboard Delivery (COD) aircraft, and logistics ports dynamically satisfy these 
replenishment requirements.  Statistics are collected throughout this process and are 







B. MODEL COMPONENTS 
 
CLFSAT is composed of an Executive controller and three main components: the 
Database, the Global SeaRoutes Network, and the Simulation.  The Executive uses 
information from the Database to coordinate the building and linking of objects, sets run 
parameters, sets up statistics collection, starts the Simulation, and controls output.  It 
merely sets the scene for the simulation and provides a central location to allow easy 
editing of desired parameters.  A separate Statistics component receives statistical 
observations from the Simulation objects and then outputs them at the end of the run.  
Figure 11 presents the general structure of CLFSAT and shows the flow of information 






















Figure 11.   CLFSAT Structure and Flow 
 
1. Database 
The Database is the primary interface for the user of CLFSAT.  It is a Microsoft 
Access database and contains seven tables that provide static information for the 
functioning of the simulation and three tables that allow the user to implement the desired 
scenario.  The Network class of the Java Simkit simulation is responsible for opening this 
database and using the table information to create lists containing the Java structures for 
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all the Global SeaRoutes network.  The DataBaseInfo class then opens this database and 
uses the table information to create lists containing the Java structures for all customer 
ships, CLF ships, PGMs, and ports.  The Network and DataBaseInfo classes maintain 
these lists for access by other parts of CLFSAT. 




This table contains data for customer ships keyed by the class name.  The 
table specifies maximum speed in knots, commodity capacities and use rates for DFM, 
JP5, ordnance, and stores, and fuel and dry replenishment transfer rates.  Also included is 
the historical CASREP rate for that class.  The reciprocal of this rate represents the mean 
inter-arrival time for a Poisson Process in hours.  
 
b. CLFData 
This table contains data for Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships, both 
station and shuttle, keyed by the class name.  The table specifies maximum speed in 
knots, own-ship DFM capacity and use rate, cargo capacities for DFM, JP5, ordnance, 
and stores, as well as fuel and dry replenishment transfer rates. 
 
c. Ports 
This table contains data for logistics ports keyed by an abbreviated name 
identifier.  The table specifies a description of the port (long name), port loading 
capacities for fuel and dry stores (in numbers of ships), cargo capacities for DFM, JP5, 
ordnance, and stores, as well as fuel and dry replenishment transfer rates.  These 
capacities are currently dummy values, as the simulation does not currently handle the 







This table contains data for Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs).  The 
table specifies a name, shipping weight (in short tons), standard quantity loadouts for 
carriers and CLF station ships and the quantity allowed in an air shipment.   
 
e. RRTs2004 
This table contains Requisition Response Times (RRTs) for all Pacific 
Fleet CASREP Whiskey Requisitions that were processed in 2004 [Ref. 23].  CLFSAT 
samples RRTs from these values.  
 
f. SeaRoutes_Nodes 
This table contains data for the nodes in the Global Sea Routes Network 
keyed by an abbreviated name identifier.  The table specifies the latitude-longitude pair 
indicating the location of the node and a description of the node (long name).  Latitude is 
positive in the Northern Hemisphere and negative in the Southern.  Longitude is positive 
East of the Prime Meridian, and negative to the West.  
 
g. SeaRoutes_Arcs 
This table contains data for the arcs between nodes in the Global Sea 
Routes Network keyed by the abbreviated name identifiers of the tail and head nodes.  
The table also specifies the maximum transit speed allowed for restricted maneuvering 
arcs, usually international straits and canals.   
  
h. CustomerShips 
This table is user-specified and contains data for the actual customer ships 
included in the specific simulation scenario.  The table specifies the name of the ship, 
hull number, class, starting latitude and longitude, and if assigned, the station ship’s 






This table is user-specified and contains data for the actual CLF ships 
included in the specific simulation scenario.  The table specifies the name of the ship, 
hull number, class, starting latitude and longitude, a flag to determine if it is a station 
ship, and the name identifier of the assigned base port if it is a shuttle ship.  This table 
must contain every CLF ship intended to be included in the simulation.  
 
j. ShipTasks 
This table is user-specified and contains supporting data for the scripted 
actions of customer and CLF station ships in the specific simulation scenario.  Each entry 
in the table specifies the name of the ship, the start and end times for the action, the 
latitude and longitude of the action, a flag to indicate if the task is a move order, and a 
flag to indicate if the task is to expend ordnance.  Movement orders are a destination and 
a no-later-than time for arrival at that destination, and as such, should require a feasible 
speed for completion.  The entries should be in chronological order by start time for any 
given ship. 
 
2. Global SeaRoutes Network 
This component is responsible for representing the navigable world as described 
in Chapter 2.  It is implemented in Java as the seaRoutes package.  This package is 
composed of four classes: GeoCoord, Node, Arc, and Network.  In addition to providing 
the structure upon which simulation objects navigate, it acts as the bridge between the 
scenario’s geographic world based on latitude and longitude and the simulation’s 
Cartesian world based on x and y coordinates. 
 
a.  GeoCoord 
This class implements a geographic coordinate in latitude and longitude 
for use by SeaRoutes network and the rest of the simulation.  Latitude is measured from 
the equator, with positive values going north and negative values going south.  Longitude 
is measured from the Prime Meridian (which is the longitude that runs through 
Greenwich, England), with positive values going east and negative values going west.  
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The class works internally in radians, but can take input and provide output in degrees.  
Algorithms are available to calculate the rhumb line distance or bearing between any two 
coordinates.  These algorithms also form the basis for the geographic to Cartesian 
translation.  The intersection of the Prime Meridan (y-axis) and the Equator (x-axis) is 
considered the Cartesian (Point2D) origin point, with x and y values calculated by rhumb 
line distance along the respective axes.  This method introduces some minor differences 
in distance between any two points, but these differences are consistent throughout the 
simulation and thus exhibit little impact. 
 
b.  Node 
This class implements the basic node in the SeaRoutes network.  It has a 
name, locations in geographic and Cartesian space, and if there is a port located at the 
node, may have a port object assigned to it.  It also maintains the data structures required 
to keep the shortest paths information calculated by a Floyd-Warshall all shortest paths 
algorithm.  By definition, once initialized by the algorithm, any node “knows” the 
shortest path and associated shortest distance to any other node. 
 
c.  Arc 
This class implements the basic arc in the SeaRoutes network.  It has a 
name, tail and head nodes, a cost (distance), a maximum allowed transit speed, and a flag 
to indicate if the arc is restricted maneuverability.  
 
d.  Network 
This class builds and maintains the SeaRoutes network consisting of 
purely nodes and arcs.  Like DataBaseInfo, it reads nodes and arcs in from CLFSAT 
DataBase and builds the internal data structures to represent the network.  Once the 
network is complete, this class performs the Floyd-Warshall all-shortest paths algorithm 
to build distance lookups and create the shortest path predecessor structure for all of the 
child nodes.  It provides an algorithm to calculate a global distance in the Cartesian grid 
that accounts for the wrap around at the International Date Line.  It also can find the 
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closest node to any given location and return the shortest path transit distance between 
any two Cartesian locations. 
 
3. Simulation (smdx) 
This component provides the objects required to run the actual Simkit simulation.  
As such, most Java classes within this smdx package are extensions of Simkit classes and 
all rely on Simkit routines to manage events and timing.  The package includes classes to 
implement all simulation objects, managers to control them, and protocols to 
communicate between them.  Specifics of each class are included below. 
 
a.  Ship 
This class implements a basic Ship object.  It is an extension of a Simkit 
UniformLinearMover, but reinterprets all of the movement routines to work within the 
Cartesian interpretation of the geographic world used by the Global SeaRoutes Network.  
It has a name, class, maximum speed, own-ship DFM capacity, current level and use rate, 
fuel and dry replenishment transfer rates, a schedule, and keeps track of its own requests 
for fuel, ordnance, or stores replenishments.  It also keeps track of the last update time for 
logistics levels, a critical requirement in a discrete event simulation that always needs to 
know how much time has passed to accurately track dynamic values.  Ships have 
methods to control simple linear movement (straight-line, set-speed, no obstacles), update 
logistics levels, request replenishment, and control execution of a scripted schedule.  The 
Ship class is the core building block for the more specific types of Ships discussed below. 
 
b.  Customer 
This class extends the Ship class to implement a customer ship, which is 
any combatant or non-combatant ship that is a generator of logistics requirements.  It has 
all the properties of the Ship class and adds own-ship capacities, current levels and use 
rates for the three remaining commodities: JP5, ordnance, and stores.  A customer tracks 
whether or not it is currently expending ordnance, and knows which CLF station ship it is 
assigned to, if any.  It also maintains its own Poisson Process to control “arrivals” of 
Casualty Reports (CASREPs) and then maintains a list of them until CLFSAT fills the 
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associated high-priority parts requirements.  Customers are able to update logistics levels, 
calculate future requirements for replenishment, schedule and cancel planned 
replenishments, and control execution of the actual Underway or Inport Replenishments 
(UNREPs or INREPs). 
 
c.  Carrier 
This class extends the Customer class to implement the specific routines 
for an aircraft carrier.  It has all the properties of the Customer class and adds the ability 
to generate a random number of air sorties on a daily basis.  This generated number of 
sorties controls ordnance and JP5 consumption.  Carriers also maintain magazines of 
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). 
 
d.  CLF 
This class extends the Ship class to implement the general routines for any 
CLF ship, which is any ship that is a provider of logistics commodities to customer ships.  
It has all the properties of the Ship class and adds cargo capacities and current levels for 
the all commodities: DFM, JP5, ordnance, and stores.  They maintain lists of CASREP 
related high-priority parts and PGMs currently staged onboard for delivery to customers.  
CLF ships know whether they are station ships and whether they are oilers, ammo ships, 
or stores replenishment ships.  If assigned as shuttle ships, they also know their assigned 
base port.  CLF ships are able to update logistics levels and control execution of the 
actual UNREPs or INREPs.  The CLF class is the core building block for the Shuttle and 
CLF station ships discussed below. 
 
e.  ShuttleCLF 
This class extends the CLF ship class to implement the specific routines 
for a CLF ship acting in a shuttle role.  These ships cycle between base ports and 
customer ships or CLF station ships to provide at-sea logistics replenishment.  Shuttle 
CLF does not add any properties to the CLF class, but does handle slightly different 
events.  CLF shuttle ships are able to evaluate planned replenishments and schedule their 
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next INREP for reloading, schedule and cancel planned replenishments, and control 
execution of Consolidations (CONSOLs) with CLF station ships. 
 
f.  StationCLF 
This class extends the CLF ship class to implement the specific routines 
for a CLF ship acting in a station ship role.  These ships operate with Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSGs) to provide at-sea logistics replenishment for all assigned customer ships.  
A CLF station ship has all the properties of the CLF class, but also keeps a queue of 
scheduled replenishments.  CLF station ships are able to evaluate planned replenishments 
and request CONSOLs from a shuttle ship as required, schedule and cancel planned 
replenishments, and control execution of CONSOLs with CLF shuttle ships.  These ships 
combine aspects of CLF shuttle ships with aspects of customer ships to enable proper 
functioning in both roles. 
 
g.  HSV 
This class extends the CLF ship class to implement the specific routines 
for HSVs acting in a shuttle role.  These ships cycle at high-speed between base ports and 
customer ships or station ships with small loads of CASREP related parts, PGMs, and 
with any excess capacity filled with generic ordnance and stores.  HSVs keep a list of 
assigned customer ships and know which of those are within range at all times.  They are 
responsible for their own scheduling based on availability of appropriate cargo and range 
to assigned customers.  When loads are available, HSVs load the material, depart port, 
transit directly to their assigned customers operating area, transfer required material, visit 
any other assigned customers that are close enough, and then return to port immediately 
to refuel and await another load.  When CASREP parts or PGM loads are not available, 
the HSV remains in port for default time, currently 48.0 hours, loads general ordnance 
and stores only, then departs to service assigned customers. 
 
h.  Port 
This class implements a port object.  It has a name, port loading capacities 
for fuel and dry stores (in numbers of ships), cargo capacities and levels for DFM, JP5, 
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ordnance, and stores, fuel and dry replenishment transfer rates, and maintains a list of 
CASREP related high-priority parts currently staged at the port for delivery to customers.  
It also keeps track of shuttle ships assigned there as a base port and it links to its node 
location in the Global SeaRoutes Network.  Ports are able to handle execution of 
INREPs.  Routines to handle strategic resupply and dynamic variation of port logistics 
levels are not implemented and represent an area for expansion of the simulation. 
 
i.  ShipTask 
This class implements a single task object that is used to populate a ship’s 
schedule with scripted and dynamic tasks.  It is the structure used to hold the scenario-
driven scripted events read from the Database ShipTasks table.  It has a start and end time 
for the task, the location (Cartesian) of the task, flags to indicate if the task is a move 
order, UNREP, INREP, CONSOL, or expenditure of ordnance, and for replenishment 
tasks, a reference to the appropriate ReplenishmentRequest. 
 
j.  ReplenishmentRequest 
This class represents the communications protocol by which a customer or 
CLF station ship requests replenishment from a CLF shuttle ship.  It has a reference to 
the requesting customer ship, the expected location and time of the replenishment, the 
assigned CLF (shuttle or station) ship for an UNREP or CONSOL, the assigned port for 
an INREP, flags to indicate whether the request is for fuel, ordnance, or stores, and a flag 
to indicate if the request has been scheduled for execution. 
 
k.  CasualtyReport 
This class represents the communications protocol by which a customer 
tells the world that it has a failure of a critical piece of equipment requiring high priority 
routing of repair parts to that customer.  CASREPs in the CLFSAT represent only those 
requiring high priority parts to correct.  Each CASREP has a reference to the requesting 
customer ship, a ship-specific serial number, the date-time-group of the report, and a flag 
to indicate whether this emergency requisition has been filled. 
 
39 
l.  PGM 
This class represents a single example of a precision guided munition 
(PGM), e.g. an AGM154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW).  It has a name, shipping 
weight and sortie use rate.  It also has standard quantity loadouts for carriers and CLF 
station ships and the quantity allowed in an air shipment. 
 
m.  PGMs 
This class represents a shipment of multiple precision guided munitions 
(PGMs).  It has a name (the same as the single PGM), a reference to the single PGM, a 
quantity, and a total shipment weight.  It also tracks the time the shipment was available 
in theater to allow statistical analysis for MOEs. 
 
n.  ReplenishmentManager 
This class performs as an executive agent to maintain, assign, and 
prioritize replenishment requests and replenishment events for all customer and CLF 
ships.  It is an attempt to best replicate within the simulation the methods by which 
COMLOGWESTPAC (CTF 73) performs this role in the real world.  The Replenishment 
Manager maintains references to all ships and ports in the simulation, lists of all 
replenishments and CASREPs, and helps to generate statistics for those replenishments. 
 The Replenishment Manager controls assignment of each customer 
Replenishment Request to either a CLF ship or INREP.  This assignment initially defaults 
to any assigned station ship.  If no station ship is assigned, the Replenishment Manager 
iteratively queries each CLF shuttle ship assigned to the closest Forward Logistics Site 
(FLS) to determine if it can add the requested replenishment to its schedule.  The CLF 
shuttle finds the appropriate place in its schedule where the new replenishment must 
occur and determines if it can still feasibly accomplish all currently scheduled 
replenishments and the new one.  If the CLF shuttle finds the new replenishment is 
feasible, it adds it to its own schedule, informs the customer that the event is scheduled, 
and reports to the Replenishment Manager that it successfully scheduled the 
replenishment.  If none of these shuttle ships can service the replenishment request, the 
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Replenishment Manager directs the customer ship to break off operations, and proceed to 
the closest logistics port for INREP.  The Replenishment Manager is also responsible for 
receiving and filling CASREP requisitions then directing the resulting high priority 
material to COD delivery if in range, and if not, staging it at the FLS for CLF shuttle 
delivery. 
 
o.  SeaRouteMoverManager 
This class acts as a manager that allows a Ship to navigate along the 
Global SeaRoutes Network from one location to another.  The Ship itself is only 
responsible for simple linear movement in a world with no obstructions and a set speed.  
The mover manager controls long distance, waypoint based routing using the Global 
SeaRoutes Network by breaking these into simple linear movements for the Ship to 
execute.  It interprets movement order ShipTasks from the Ship’s schedule and controls 
their execution.  The mover manager maintains a reference to the Ship it controls, a list of 
waypoints and the Ship’s place in them, the location (Cartesian) of the destination, the 
expected arrival time, the current speed, and a reference to the network it is moving on.  
It is also capable of calculating the future projected position for a Ship given a time.  
 
p.  ArrivalProcess 
This class implements a random arrival process given passed parameters 
and the inter-arrival time distribution.  This allows it to schedule arrivals for any desired 
distribution.  The Customer class uses this class to implement CASREP arrivals.  It is 




This component is responsible for collecting statistical observations from the 
simulation and placing them in a data structure.  It does not specify which statistics to 
collect or how they should be organized, but processes and stores any numerical statistics 
sent to it.  Individual observations specify an owner (whose number it is), a type of 
41 
statistic (the name of the statistic to be tracked), a time stamp, and a value.  Succeeding 
observations are associated with previous observations by owner and type.  When the 
simulation is complete, statistics can be output to an Excel spreadsheet workbook.  In that 
workbook, each owner gets a separate sheet, with each type of statistic organized in 
columns with time and value pairs. 
 
C. ASSUMPTIONS & DATA SETS 
 
1. Force Structure and Availability 
Only U.S. Navy forces available in 2005 are used.  The force structure 
used for analysis in the simulation is based on the Fleet Response Plan which permits 
deployment of 6 Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) within thirty days and an additional two 
CSGs within 60 days after that.  Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF), as well as 3rd 
and 7th Fleets, provide additional forces.  Combat Logistics Force ships typically assigned 
to CTF73 are available to service replenishment requests.  CLFSAT does not implement 
submarines due to limited logistics support requirements. 
 
a. Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) 
CSGs are assumed to consist of one Aircraft Carrier (CV or CVN), two 
Guided Missile Cruisers (CG 52), two Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG 51 or 79), one 
Guided Missile Frigate (FFG 7), and one Fast Combat Support Ship (T-AOE) acting as 
the CLF station ship.  Actual composition of CSGs does vary from this core design based 
on combatant availability.  Some CSGs will also substitute an Oiler (T-AO)/Ammunition 
Ship (T-AE or T-AKE) pair for the T-AOE. 
 
b. Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) 
ESGs are assumed to consist of one Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA or 
LHD), one Amphibious Transport, Dock (LPD 4), one Landing Ship, Dock (LSD 41 or 
49), one Guided Missile Cruiser (CG 52), one Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG 51 or 79), 
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and one Guided Missile Frigate (FFG 7).  ESGs are not assigned CLF station ships and 
are reliant on CLF shuttle ships for sustainment. 
 
c. Surface Strike Groups (SSGs) 
Though not as common as CSGs or ESGs, Surface Strike Groups (SSGs) 
are still a legitimate deployment construct, especially with FDNF, Japan.  SSGs perform 
strike missions and theater ballistic missile defense.  A typical SSG consists of one 
Guided Missile Cruiser (CG 52), and two Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG 51 or 79). 
 
d. Combat Logistics Force (CLF) Ships 
There are several CLF Shuttle ships assigned to COMLOGWESTPAC for 
tasking in 7th  Fleet.  One of the T-AOs could be unavailable while deployed to 5th Fleet 
or undergoing required maintenance after that deployment.  The rest are assumed 
available, with the potential to draw CLF from other fleets in a large MCO scenario.  The 
shuttle ships tend to operate from three main base ports, Sasebo in Japan, Guam, and 
Singapore.  Table 3 lists the CLF Shuttle ships assigned to COMLOGWESTPAC in June 
2004.  The particular ships assigned may change over time, but the numbers generally 
remain the same. 
 
Fuel Ordnance Stores 
USNS Guadalupe (T-AO 200) USNS Kiska (T-AE 35) USNS Concord (T-AFS 5) 
USNS Yukon (T-AO 202) USNS Shasta (T-AE 33) USNS San Jose (T-AFS 7) 
USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194)  USNS Niagara Falls (T-AFS 3) 
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)   
Table 3. CLF Shuttle Ships Assigned to COMLOGWESTPAC, June 2004 
 
2. Replenishment Planning Cycle 
Planning for logistics replenishments is typically governed by tracking a ship’s 
percentages of commodities remaining and requiring replenishments when those 
percentages reach a pre-defined reserve level.  In the most common case, a customer ship 
is part of a CSG, with an assigned multi-product CLF station ship.  When a customer’s 
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current level in any commodity falls to 50 percent of the total storage capacity for that 
commodity, an underway replenishment (UNREP) is called for from the CLF station 
ship.  In turn, when the CLF station ship’s current level in any commodity falls to 30 
percent of the total storage capacity for that commodity, a consolidation (CONSOL) for 
that commodity is called for from a single-product CLF shuttle ship.  These CLF shuttle 
ships essentially cycle continuously between the CLF station ship and logistics resupply 
ports.  Figure 12 illustrates this most typical replenishment cycle.  Since ESGs are not 
assigned CLF station ships, UNREP requests are usually handled by the Amphibious 
Assault Ship (LHA or LHD) or CLF shuttle ships directly.  CLF shuttle ships must 
handle ships in SSGs or independent steaming directly or they are forced to INREP. 
Shuttle Ship Station Ship CSG
 
Figure 12.   CONSOL and UNREP Cycle 
 
3. Commodities Consumption and Logistics Planning Factors 
In order to plan future logistics support for naval forces, it is necessary to forecast 
the logistics requirements of those forces.  This is nearly impossible without a set of pre-
defined, fixed usage factors.  These are referred to as Logistics Planning Factors (LPFs) 
and are used extensively by all of the services.  In naval logistics, these LPFs are usually 
expressed as a rate per time usage, e.g. barrels of fuel per day, or inversely, as “Days of 
Supply.”  There are, unfortunately, fundamental inaccuracies caused by using LPFs. 
Based on average values, LPFs fail to capture variations in activity levels and only 
represent accurate values over the long run.  As the granularity of the time period is 
increased, LPFs can look increasingly inaccurate.  Despite these problems, LPFs are one 
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of the only feasible methods for quickly forecasting logistics requirements, thus are relied 
upon quite heavily in both planning logistics support and modeling logistics processes. 
Historically, the Navy has had difficulties defining a single, durable set of 
accurate LPFs.  These LPFs remain accurate only as long as their base data set remains a 
relevant representation of current naval operations.  For Operation Desert Storm (ODS) 
in 1991, the Navy still used ordnance LPFs based on Vietnam War usage rates, which 
were fundamentally inaccurate after 20 years of aircraft and precision-guided munitions 
(PGMs) advancements.  Unfortunately, ordnance LPFs revised to reflect the reality of 
ODS strike operations were equally inaccurate when applied to OEF in 2001 and OIF in 
2003.  Ten more years of advancements in PGMs, threw all predictions of tons of 
ordnance per sortie and sorties per day out the window. 
Recently, OPNAV N42 standardized naval LPFs and logistics capacity data for 
Navy ships.  The fundamental inability to compare the results of studies and analysis that 
used differing LPFs and capacities drove this standardization effort.  Standardization 
allows all analysis and planning to start with a common set of assumptions and increases 
the ability to compare and analyze alternatives.  N42 collected the different LPFs and 
capacity numbers used throughout the Navy, categorized and normalized them, then 
selected the ones that best represent current naval operations.  The complete set of these 
planning factors was approved in July 2004. [Ref. 19] 
Many CLF analysis models, especially the Borden, Givens, and Cardillo 
optimization models mentioned earlier [Refs. 16, 17, and 18] use these LPFs to represent 
actual consumption in their model.  This reliance on “average” values creates potential 
inaccuracies in their results.  Fortunately, CLFSAT is a simulation, not a highly 
abstracted optimization model of naval logistics.  This allows CLFSAT to use these 
standardized LPFs only for forecasting and replenishment planning, while it models 
actual consumption of some commodities with higher fidelity, such as using actual speed 





a. Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) 
DFM is ship’s propulsion fuel and ship class, propulsion plant 
configuration, and speed drive consumption.  N42’s planning factors for DFM have two 
levels, surge (high-speed) and sustain (cruising speed), and are expressed in barrels 
consumed per day.  These planning factors are sufficient for planning purposes, but 
inaccurate for a simulation that needs to determine actual fuel consumption over short 
time periods.  A study on predicting ship fuel consumption by Schrady, Smyth, and 
Vassian [Ref. 21] provides a more accurate option.  The study performed regression 
analysis on ship class fuel consumption trials data to develop predictive equations for fuel 
consumption per hour dependent on speed.  CLFSAT uses these equations to control 
actual consumption of DFM by each ship.  Using the class-specific coefficients in Table 





                                     is fuel consumption (gal./hr)
              is ship speed in knots
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Ship Class p0 p1 p2 
CV-63/67 10865.9000 -8937.6000 32.6666 
CG-52 2215.3900 -1429.0400 37.4831 
DDG-51/79 1379.6200 -764.4330 51.5925 
FFG-7 951.1170 -545.7160 51.8843 
LHA-1 6530.1500 -5577.6800 39.3264 
LHD-1 2039.4100 -700.8110 78.209 
LPD-4 1566.7900 -1124.4300 95.4647 
LSD-41 32693.5000 -32454.8000 2.8619 
T-AOE 6 -12232.3000 12117.2000 -25.7866 
T-AO 187 -4614.8100 4834.5400 -44.9642 
T-AE 26 -16150.3000 16343.7000 -8.8660 
T-AFS-1 1727.4600 -1471.6600 55.5118 






b. Aviation Fuel (JP5) 
JP5 is aviation fuel used by aircraft on the carrier and helicopters on the 
smaller combatants.  JP5 usage is OPTEMPO driven.  For the smaller combatants, JP5 is 
only used by their organic helicopter assets, which fly limited hours per day.  This makes 
use of a JP5 planning factor reasonable.  For aircraft carriers, JP5 varies extensively 
based on the number of sorties flown per day.  The number of sorties per day varies based 
on operations plans, ordnance resupply, and operational availability of the aircraft.  A 
1992 NPS study titled “Carrier Air Wing Sortie Rates and Fuel Use” [Ref. 22] examined 
this issue and found that the variation in number of sorties takes the form of a normal 
distribution.  The study examined two carriers in both an exercise and ODS and 
developed the normal means and variances for the four situations.  For active combat 
operations, CLFSAT uses the average of the four different situations, with a mean of 100 
sorties and a standard deviation of 15.  The minimum level of air activity experienced 
during transits is derived from N42’s sustainment LPFs and represented by 57 daily 
sorties. 
The study further found that once the number of sorties for the day is 
determined, a simple regression equation provides daily JP5 usage for the airwing: 
 5( ) 6.11 2.31*JP kgal Sorties= − +  
Converting this consumption to barrels yields: 
 5( ) 145.48 55*JP bbls Sorties= − +  
 
c. Ordnance 
Ordnance consumption is also dependent on operations and is more 
complex than any other commodity.  For the smaller combatants, the number of 
submarine prosecutions, air raids defended against, enemy surface ships engaged, and 
strike and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) missions fired drives ordnance 
consumption.  In some cases, this ordnance is not replenishable at sea (e.g., Tomahawks), 
so the consumption is irrelevant for logistics resupply purposes.  For aircraft carriers, the 
number of defensive sorties and strike sorties flown drives the consumption.  Rough 
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analysis of ODS, OEF and OIF data indicate that an average value of 1.5 short tons per 
sortie is reasonable. 
 
d. Stores 
Stores consist of Class I Subsistence, Class VI Personal Demand Items, 
and Class IX Repair Parts.  They are the one commodity that appears not to vary based on 
the activity of the ship.  Consumption of stores stays constant as long as number of 
personnel onboard stays constant.  This only becomes an issue for amphibious ships that 
offload their embarked Marines.  Due to this constancy, stores consumption behaves very 
much like a LPF.  The N42 LPF [Ref. 19] for stores consumption per day by ship class is 
used in CLFSAT and is presented below in Table 5. 
 











Table 5. Stores Consumption LPF by Ship Class [After Ref. 19] 
 
4. Ship Logistics Capacities 
When N42 standardized planning factors, they also standardized the commodity 
capacities for each ship class [Ref. 19].  These numbers reflect actual usable and 
transferable capacities that take into account ship design restrictions and stability issues.  
The carriers normally reserve a significant portion of the listed JP5 capacity (up to 12,000 
bbl) for transfer to small combatants in their CSG.  For the new T-AKE, the Ordnance 
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and Stores capacities are reconfigurable and entries represent the standard configuration.  
Table 6 presents the standardized capacities. 
 












CVN-68 0 0 74642 1765 1710 
CV-63/67 54283 0 45124 1765 1247 
CG-52 15032 0 475 94 68 
DDG-51/79 10518 0 475 48 55 
FFG-7 4286 0 475 16 35 
LHA-1 45125 0 10450 391 520 
LHD-1 42976 0 9952 391 520 
LPD-4 17700 0 443 88 195 
LSD-41 19150 0 1144 38 140 
T-AOE 6 30000 52770 42036 2593 1111 
T-AO 187 12357 72000 56873 0 220 
T-AE 26 12350 5634 0 4928 0 
T-AFS-1 12350 5634 0 0 4518 
T-AKE 12357 18000 8000 4700* 1180* 
T-HSV Varies 0 475 Varies Varies 
Table 6. Ship Commodity Capacities [After Ref. 19] 
 
 
5. Ship Replenishment Transfer Rates 
N42 also standardized transfer rates for at-sea replenishment [Ref. 19] These are 
specified as maximum “give rates” for CLF ships and maximum “receive” rates for 
customer ships.  Dry transfer rates are a combination of connected replenishment 
(CONREP) and vertical replenishment (VERTREP), except for the T-HSV which is 









Dry           
Transfer 
(stons/hr) 
CVN-65/68 21420 271 
CV-63/67 12855 271 
CG-52, DDG-51/79, FFG-7 8568 135 
LHA-1/LHD-1 8568 271 
LPD-4 4285 135 
LSD-41 8568 135 
T-AOE 6 21420 271 
T-AO 187 21420 100 
T-AE 26 0 271 
T-AFS-1 4285 271 
T-AKE 4285 271 
T-HSV 0 130 
Table 7. Replenishment Transfer Rates [After Ref. 19] 
 
6. Casualty Report Frequencies 
Arrivals of CASREPs are assumed to follow a Poisson Process with 
corresponding inter-arrival times that are exponentially distributed.  The parameter most 
commonly used to define the Poisson Process is λ, used to represent the rate of the 
process.  When inverted to 1/ λ, this represents the expected value or mean of the 
exponential inter-arrival times.  This means, that on average, there are 1/ λ time units 
between arrivals, so the arrivals come at an average rate of λ per unit time.  To most 
accurately represent the CASREP arrival process, the rate should be derived from actual 
data.  The following provides an unbiased estimator of 1/ λ [Ref. 20]: 
1 2
k k
 is the i-th inter-arrival time
...     is the sum of the first k inter-arrival times





T X X X
λ λ
= + + +
=
 
The U.S. Navy Priority Material Office provided a database containing all 
CASREP-related (Whiskey) requisitions for Pacific Fleet surface force ships for the last 
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five years [Ref. 23].  Commander, Naval Air Forces provided similar data for carriers and 
their associated air wings [Ref. 24].  The data for each ship is segregated and used to 
calculate actual inter-arrival times, then the unbiased estimator, Tk/k, is used to calculate 
the mean inter-arrival time for that ship.  These ship-specific means are averaged for all 
ships in a class to establish class-specific CASREP mean inter-arrival times.  Individual 
ship means can be skewed by deployments and maintenance periods.  Using five years of 
data will tend to smooth this out and aggregating to class-specific means will smooth 


















Table 8. CASREP Mean Inter-Arrival Times by Ship Class [After Ref. 23 & 
24] 
 
7. Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) 
For some scenarios, PGMs are in short supply.  There is a small quantity available 
on each carrier, and one full carrier resupply quantity available on each CLF station ship.  
The rest of the PGM inventory is stored in CONUS, not in theater munitions stockpiles.  
Combat operations consume available stocks of PGMs within the theater very quickly, 
requiring shipment of additional PGMs from CONUS via a T-AE, T-AKE, or MSC 
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sealift ship.  Activating this ship, sending it to load at a Weapons Station, transiting to the 
theater and then offloading to theater munitions stockpiles could take weeks.  During this 
delay, the Navy must supply PGMs to the theater by other means.  The only method 
faster than sealift is airlift by military transport.  The quantity of airlifted PGMs is limited 
by their explosive potential, so this method is not capable of providing a massive 
throughput of weapons.  Airlift serves to “fill the gap” while sealift delivers the bulk of 
the PGMs.  For each of the PGMs, CLFSAT requires weight and appropriate loadout 
data.  Public domain sources provide much of the data [Ref. 25 & 26]; the rest is notional 
data that does not influence the MOEs of CLFSAT, and which can easily be replaced by 
real data if available.  The Air Shipment Load Data is also notional and sized to allow a 
complete shipment of all six PGMs in specified quantities to weigh less than half of the 
full cargo capacity for one C-17, and to limit Net Explosive Weight totals for the 
shipment.  Table 9 details these notional, unclassified numbers for the specific PGMs 
implemented. 
  










AGM-154 JSOW 0.6 10 10 10 
AGM-158 JASSM 1.13 10 10 5 
AIM-120 AMRAAM 0.17 300 300 50 
KMU-556 JDAM Kit 0.075 50 50 100 
KMU-558 JDAM Kit 0.1 100 100 100 
KMU-559 JDAM Kit 0.05 200 200 100 
Table 9. Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), Notional Data [After Ref. 25 & 
26] 
 
8. HSV Characteristics 
Incat 112M High-speed Support Ship (HSSS) and the reference design for the 
Army TSV provide the basis for HSVs in CLFSAT.  Naval Sea Systems Command 
engineers have analyzed performance of HSV-X1 JOINT VENTURE and HSV-2 SWIFT 
to produce optimistic performance characteristics of payload versus speed versus range 
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for this future HSV [Ref. 27].  Table 10 provides examples of these tradeoffs for two 
different ranges.  It is clear from Table 10 that increasing speed or range, requires greater 
fuel loads with corresponding decreases in cargo capacity.  The implemented Scenario 1 
uses an HSV with fuel and cargo loads for the 1250 nautical mile range at 40 knots.  
Scenario 2 uses the 2500nm range numbers.  Both scenarios subtract 100 stons of cargo 
capacity for magazine and embarked helicopter with pack-up kit weight. 
 











10 310 932 619 887 
15 607 888 1214 800 
20 881 848 1762 720 
25 1250 794 2500 612 
30 1548 751 3095 525 
35 1770 733 3339 489 
40 1821 711 3643 445 
Table 10. Payload vs. Speed vs. Range Samples for notional HSV [After Ref. 27] 
 
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND CLFSAT OUTPUT 
 
CLFSAT uses an internal statistical system to collect observations of various 
parameters of interest throughout the simulation execution.  These observations are used 
to calculate statistics and generate graphs that depict Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).  
There are several MOEs built into CLFSAT and detailed below. 
 
1. Commodity Load Percentages 
CLFSAT tracks the current percent of commodity capacity by time for each ship 
and each commodity.  This allows easy visibility of the performance of the sustainment 
process.  Violations of established commodity reserve levels can be examined and 
quantified by magnitude, duration, or frequency. 
53 
2. Inter-Replenishment and Inter-Consolidation Times 
CLFSAT tracks time between replenishment events for each customer ship to 
reflect level of customer service provided to that particular ship during the scenario.  
Long delays between replenishments can indicate scenarios that are particularly difficult 
given the CLF force level and number of customer ships involved. 
 
3. Theater Customer Wait Time (CWT) 
This is the CWT for CASREP related parts from time of arrival in theater to time 
of delivery to the appropriate customer.  Examination of these values between different 
scenarios can show differences in high-priority material distribution. 
 
4. Theater Delays for PGM Delivery 
This is the delay time (similar to CWT) for delivery of PGMs to aircraft carriers 
once the PGMs arrive in the theater.  Examination of these values between different 
scenarios can show improvements in the rapid delivery of these critical munitions. 
 
5. CLF Shuttle Ship Activity Levels & Cycle Times 
CLFSAT also tracks the timing and quantities transferred for all UNREPs, 
CONSOLs, and INREPs for CLF shuttle ships.  This provides visibility of how over or 
under tasked CLF shuttle ships are in a particular scenario.  This information can be used 





CLFSAT is capable of implementing any naval scenario.  In order to best address 
COMLOGWESTPAC’s research questions, this thesis implements multiple scenarios 
involving a Major Combat Operation (MCO) in Korea.  The scenario is hypothetical and 
not based on any actual Operations Plans.  Force levels are derived from a 1992 New 
York Times article discussing Pentagon war plans [Ref. 28] and GlobalSecurity’s 
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detailed discussion of Korea plans [Ref. 29], then modified by the current Fleet Response 
Plan, and forces available in May 2005.  The scenarios are 60 days long, providing 
sufficient time to develop any apparent differences between naval logistics force 
structures.  Each scenario is analyzed with multiple excursions.  The following 
paragraphs, and Figure 13 and 14 describe the scenarios. 
 
1. Korea MCO Scenario 1: FLS Sasebo Base Case 
The scenario starts in May 2005 and begins with two days of indications and 
warnings of military activity along the DMZ in North Korea.  This allows the Navy to 
sortie some of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) in Japan and to begin 
preparing other ships to deploy.  Thus, on C-Day, the Kitty Hawk CSG has just put to sea 
in the Pacific, south of Yokosuka, and is able to begin transit immediately to an operating 
area in the northern Yellow Sea (aka the West Sea).  The Kitty Hawk CSG arrives on 
station on C+2 and immediately begins conducting offensive and defensive air 
operations.  The Nimitz CSG has recently deployed from San Diego and is already in 
transit across the Pacific.  It will arrive on station in the Yellow Sea on C+10 and 
immediately begin offensive and defensive air operations.  The Carl Vinson CSG 
deployed in February on an around-the-world cruise and on C-Day is preparing to depart 
the Arabian Gulf.  A high-speed transit allows the Vinson CSG to arrive on station in the 
western Sea of Japan (aka the East Sea) by C+12, and also begin offensive air operations 
immediately.  On C-day, the Ronald Reagan CSG is inport San Diego preparing to surge 
deploy.  The CSG sails on C+4, arrives on station in the Sea of Japan on C+17, and 
immediately begins offensive air operations.  The Abraham Lincoln CSG is inport 
Everett, WA on C-day also preparing to surge, and she sails for San Diego on C+3 to 
onload her air wing.  The CSG deploys from San Diego on C+8, arrives on station in the 
Yellow Sea on C+21, and also immediately begins offensive air operations.  The 
peculiarities of the Fleet Response Plan as it exists in May of 2005 mean that the first five 
of the CSGs available come from the Pacific Fleet.  There are no more carriers to draw 
from in the Pacific Fleet, as the Stennis is in a 10 month Docking Planned Incremental 
Availability (DPIA) at Bremerton.  The sixth and any additional CSGs must thus come 
from Atlantic Fleet carriers, all of which are inport, or in workups.  The Truman CSG, 
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having just returned from deployment is first on the list available to surge.  Rather than 
sending the Truman CSG on a 23-day transit to Korea, the Navy decides to handle the 
Korean MCO with the five carriers already deployed, and deploys the Truman CSG to 
the Mediterranean and potentially the Arabian Gulf to dissuade any opportunistic action 
by other countries. 
Normally, ESGs and SSGs deploy as well.  If these forces operate within range of 
the carrier operating areas, they could operate as part of the “Sea Base” and fall under 
support of the CLF station ships.  If they operate independently, they create additional 
requirements for CLF shuttle support.  For the purpose of this analysis, this scenario does 
not implement ESGs and SSGs.  The methodology of the Scenario Base Case 
implementation and comparison with the excursions means this omission will not change 
the results of the analysis.  Specifics of this methodology are detailed below and in 
Chapter IV.  This force deployment is presented in Figure 13. 
To support this large selection of combatants, COMLOGWESTPAC begins the 
scenario with their normally assigned CLF shuttle ships as detailed in Table 3 on page 42.  
Additional CLF assets will augment as required to support the operations of the customer 
ships in the theater.  San Jose (T-AFS 7) and Yukon (T-AO 202) are operating out of 
Singapore and will stay in place to support ships transiting through the Indian Ocean, 
Malacca Straits, and South China Sea.  Concord (T-AFS 5), Guadalupe (T-AO 200), and 
Kiska (T-AE 35) are operating near Guam.  These three ships will not be required in the 
Guam area, so depart for Sasebo on C+2 through C+4, arriving between C+6 and C+8.  
Kilauea (T-AE 26), not normally assigned to COMLOGWESTPAC, is just finishing a 
maintenance period in Guam when notified that she is needed to augment the normally 
assigned T-AEs.  She departs for Sasebo on C+4, arriving in the area on C+8.  Niagara 
Falls (T-AFS 3), John Ericsson (T-AO 194), and Shasta (T-AE 33) are operating around 
Japan, based out of Sasebo, and are prepared to support operations.  Tippecanoe (T-AO 
199) was transiting from Singapore to Sasebo to relieve John Ericsson, but will finish the 
transit and both ships will stay to provide additional oiler support.  An additional oiler, 
Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193), is operating out of San Diego in support of 3rd Fleet 
operations.  She deploys on C+4 to arrive in the operations area on C+22. 
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Figure 13.   Korea MCO Scenario 1: FLS Sasebo 
 
a. Excursion 1-1: Current CLF plus Two HSVs 
The first excursion for Scenario 1 uses the same CLF force structure as the 
Base Case, but adds HSVs operating out of Sasebo.  This excursion adds two HSVs, one 
for each carrier operating area, as it assumes that would be the minimum effective 
addition, but any number could be added.  These HSVs will continuously shuttle from 
Sasebo to customer ships in the operating areas of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.  
The HSVs will primarily carry PGMs, with general ordnance and stores filling any 
remaining cargo capacity.  PGMs, general ordnance and stores are transferred to the 
primary assigned customer for each cycle, then the remainder of the assigned customers 
are visited until no cargo remains.  While the HSVs are also tasked to carry CASREP 
related high priority material, they are not required to for this scenario as the small size of 
the Korea MCO Theater place all operating areas within COD range.  This small theater 
also allows use of the HSV specifications for 1250 nm range at 40 knots. 
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b. Excursion 1-2: Reduced Current CLF plus Two HSVs 
This excursion seeks to take advantage of any efficiencies created in 
Excursion 1 by inclusion of the two HSVs.  The non-HSV CLF force structure from 
Excursion 1 will be reduced to the minimum sufficient to allow a feasible run, and then 
compared to the base case. 
 
2. Korea MCO Scenario 2: FLS Guam Base Case 
This a modification of Scenario 1 that attempts to stress any results from that 
scenario by hypothesizing a North Korean nuclear blackmail of Japan, forcing the 
withdrawal of access to Japanese logistics ports.  All customer ship operations remain the 
same as Scenario 1, but the loss of Sasebo, Iwakuni, Yokosuka, and Okinawa forces the 
U.S. to fall back on the closest assured Forward Logistics Site (FLS), Guam.  This greatly 
changes the dynamic of supportability, as one-way transits from the FLS port to the 
customers roughly quadruple, increasing from 420 nautical miles to 1840 nautical miles.  
This large increase in required shuttle cycle time drives a requirement for additional CLF 
shuttle ships, which are drawn from other theaters.  Additionally, the CLF shuttle ships 
will be the sole means of distributing CASREP related high priority material, as all 
operating areas are outside COD range from Guam.  Developing the specific CLF force 
structure is part of the Base Case, detailed in Chapter IV.  Figure 14 illustrates this 
scenario. 
 
a. Excursion 2-1: Current CLF plus Two HSVs 
This excursion for Scenario 2 uses the same CLF force structure as the 
Scenario 2 Base Case, as specified in Chapter IV, but adds two HSVs operating out of 
Sasebo.  These HSVs will continuously shuttle from Guam to customer ships in the 
operating areas of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.  In addition to PGMs, the HSVs 
will have priority over the CLF shuttle ships on CASREP related high priority material.  
General ordnance and stores will fill any remaining cargo capacity.  The larger transit 
distances in this scenario forces use of the HSV specifications for 2500 nm range at 40 
knots, and an assumption that HSVs refuel from the station ships in conjunction with 
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CONSOLs, before returning to port.  HSV specifications are available for 4000nm range, 



































Figure 14.   Korea MCO Scenario 2: FLS Guam 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. KOREA MCO SCENARIO 1: FLS SASEBO 
 
1. Base Case: Current CLF Only 
Development of the Scenario 1 Base Case required several successive CLFSAT 
runs.  The scenario initially consists of the naval operations of the customer ships and all 
the normally assigned COMLOGWESTPAC CLF shuttle ships (see Table 3, p. 42), 
placed in their traditional operating areas (Singapore, Guam, and Sasebo).  A CLFSAT 
run produces the MOEs, which are evaluated to determine if all customer ships are 
sufficiently supported.  The customer ships in this initial run displayed severe violations 
of reserve commodity levels, with some ships unable to perform the scripted scenario 
operations.  To perform analysis of this scenario, a feasible and valid Base Case is 
required.  Therefore, these sustainment deficiencies must be corrected, which involves 
iterative alteration of the CLF force structure, rerun of CLFSAT, and reevaluation of the 
MOEs.  Actual alterations to the CLF force structure involved shifting the assigned CLF 
shuttles within the theater and augmenting with additional CLF from outside the theater 
until the customer ships can be sustained and are able to conduct all scripted scenario 
operations.  An additional oiler, USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193), is required to 
augment from outside the theater to rectify some JP5 shortages in the CSGs late in the 
scenario.  Additionally, the original COMLOGWESTPAC force of two assigned T-AEs, 
which in terms of capacity should be sufficient to sustain the combat forces, proved 
insufficient in the later periods of the scenario when all five CSGs are conducting 
operations.  This was not an insufficient capacity issue, but a timing issue, specifically an 
inability to get the two T-AEs to two separate sides of the Korean peninsula as often as 
necessary.  These problems are rectified by adding an additional ammunition ship, USNS 
Kilauea (T-AE 26), to the scenario.  The final Base Case shuttle CLF force structure is 
five T-AOs (+ 1), three T-AEs (+ 1), and three T-AFSs (+ 0).  
Thus, the Scenario 1 Base Case assumes supportability of the scripted naval 
operations for the Korea MCO and verifies such with a CLFSAT run after augmenting 
normal COMLOGWESTPAC CLF assets.  Since the Base Case is feasible by design, 
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analysis within that one case is neither interesting nor relevant.  The analysis is only valid 
when comparing MOEs across excursions, which vary CLF force structure within the 
same scenario.  To this end, the results for the Base Case are only presented where 
relevant in comparison with the following excursions. 
 
2. Excursion 1-1: Current CLF plus Two HSVs 
This excursion is composed of the Base Case’s proven feasible CLF allocation 
augmented by two HSVs.  The HSVs should allow improvements in distribution of 
PGMs, ordnance, and stores.  Due to the small size of the Korea MCO Theater, they 
should not show significant improvement in distribution of CASREP related priority 
material, as the majority of the theater is within COD range.  The following sub-sections 
present the results of Excursion 1-1 compared to the Base Case.  These two cases are 
compared and evaluated using the MOEs of Commodity Load Percentages, Inter-
Replenishment Times, CASREP Theater Customer Wait Time, Theater Delay for PGM 
Delivery, and an analysis of Ordnance CONSOLs. 
  
a. Commodity Load Percentages 
Examining the commodity load percentages of customer ships over time 
also illustrates differences in the performance of the two compared CLF force structures.  
In this scenario, all customer ships operate in CSGs with CLF station ships.  Since the 
Base Case adds CLF shuttles until the station ships are capable of replenishing their 
assigned combatants as required, the commodity percentages of the combatants are 
mostly uninteresting as they get what they need from the station ship when they need it.  
On the other hand, the CLF station ship is dependent on the dynamic shuttle cycles, so 
will exhibit the most variation in its commodity loads based on the excursions that vary 
shuttle CLF force structure and employment.  The ability to look at the commodity levels 
of only the station ships simplifies the analysis and makes differences between excursions 
much more visible.  This analysis will also only examine station ship ordnance and stores 
percentages, as wet products are not effectively carried by HSVs, thus are not part of the 
comparison. 
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Figure 15 presents the ordnance percentage for one of the station ships as 
tracked throughout the scenario; the others follow similar patterns, so are not presented.  
For the first 12 days, the stations ship’s CSG is transiting from the Arabian Gulf to the 
operating area in the Sea of Japan.  Once on station, the carrier commences offensive air 
operations, and requires ordnance transfers from this station ship.  The Base Case 
ordnance percentage shows three reserve violations (levels below 30%), has a lower 
mean (µ = 0.70), and appears to vary more (σ = 0.29) than Excursion 1-1.  In Excursion 
1-1, the HSV’s continuous small ordnance shipments (filling space not taken by PGMs) 
is sufficient to maintain the station ship in a better supply state with less variation (µ = 
0.77, σ = 0.21).  Additionally, despite the same heavy ordnance use in each case, the 
station ship violates reserve levels only once when supported by the HSVs in Excursion 
1-1. 


























Figure 15.   Scenario 1: Station Ship Ordnance Percentage between Base Case and 
Excursion 1-1 
 
Figure 16 presents the stores percentages for the same station ship.  Both 
graphs are on the same scale, so it is obvious that levels of stores are never a sustainment 
issue.  It is interesting to note that in both the Base Case and Excursion 1-1, the T-AFS 
Combat Stores ships never leave port, as there is never a demand great enough to require 
their services.  All of the stores increases in the Base Case come from the small stores 
capacity of the T-AOs, which is sufficient to sustain the customer ships well above 
reserve levels of stores.  As before, the Base Case stores level percentage does stay lower 
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with more variability (µ = 0.89, σ = 0.08), while Excursion 1-1 exhibits a higher mean 
and less variability (µ = 0.96, σ = 0.06). 
























Figure 16.   Scenario 1: Station Ship Stores Percentage between Base Case and 
Excursion 1-1 
 
b. Station Ship Inter-CONSOL Times 
Inter-CONSOL times for an individual station ship directly reflect the 
customer service level for that ship.  While each CONSOL may not be critical, each is an 
opportunity to provide a needed service, whether it is transfer of high-priority material, 
ordnance, mail, or simply fresh fruits and vegetables.  In the Base Case, these CONSOLs 
are the traditional high quantity transfers from large single commodity CLF shuttle ships.  
Excursion 1-1 mixes these traditional CONSOLs with smaller HSV hits for PGMs, 
ordnance, and stores.  Despite their scale difference, these HSV hits are considered 
CONSOLs for this analysis. 
Figure 17 presents one station ship’s inter-CONSOL times throughout the 
duration of the scenario.  For the first 12 days, the stations ship’s CSG is transiting from 
the Arabian Gulf to the operating area in the Sea of Japan.  In the Base Case, the inter-
CONSOL time remains high early in the simulation while the ships of the CSG deplete 
initially full stocks.  After the first 30 days, it appears to stabilize around four to six days 
between CONSOLs.  The curve for Excursion 1-1 is dramatically different.  It is clear 
that once the HSVs begin running, they hit the station ship every 48 hours.  A 
combination of an HSV CONSOL with a CLF shuttle ship CONSOL in a short period 
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causes the dips below 48 hours.  Scheduled arrivals of airlifted PGMs at the FLS drive 
this 48-hour timing for the HSVs.  The relatively short transit distances in this Korea 
MCO scenario allow the HSVs to cycle from port to customer and back to port in roughly 
24 hours, so even shorter inter-CONSOL times are possible if more rapid arrival of 
priority loads forces them.  Overall, this MOE shows that, in a small theater of 
operations, like Korea or the Arabian Gulf, HSVs can hit the station ships quite 
frequently. 




























Figure 17.   Scenario 1: Station Ship Inter-CONSOL Times between Base Case 
and Excursion 1-1 
 
c. Theater Customer Wait Time (CWT) 
In these two cases, the in-theater portion of CWT for distribution of 
CASREP parts requisitions is identical as presented in Table 11.  While HSVs are tasked 
with delivery of CASREP high-priority material, the Korea MCO operations areas are all 
within range of COD aircraft, which have priority on deliveries of this material.  The 
Korea MCO scenario also has all customer ships operating within range of an aircraft 
carrier, thus allowing COD distribution to the CSG, followed by VOD distribution within 
the CSG.  These delay times are also very short due to the COD/VOD delivery method.  
Reliance on CLF Shuttle or HSV delivery should greatly increase these delay times.  In 
any scenario with CSGs operating outside COD range, or with independent ESGs, SSGs, 
or customer ships, these numbers will differ between the cases.  This presents an 




 CASREP Requisition Theater Delay (Hours) 
 Base Case Excursion 1-1 
95% CI High 33.47 33.47 
Mean 30.82 30.82 
95% CI Low 28.18 28.18 
Table 11. Scenario 1: CASREP Requisition in Theater Distribution Delay 
between Base Case and Excursion 1-1 
 
d. Theater Delays for PGM Delivery 
The in-theater portion of delay time in the distribution of critical PGMs is 
the single largest difference between the two cases.  This delay is specifically defined as 
the time in hours between PGM arrival via airlift at the Forward Logistics Site (Sasebo) 
and their delivery to the aircraft carriers.  In the Base Case, T-AEs distribute PGMs from 
the FLS to the CSGs.  Unfortunately, the T-AEs only do this as part of their normal 
demand-based shuttle cycling.  This, combined with their slow speed, leads to a huge 
delay in delivery of PGMs, typically in excess of 12 days.  Additionally, the T-AEs are 
only able to deliver 144 of the 180 specific PGM shipments airlifted during the 60-day 
run of the scenario.  The rest remained at the FLS awaiting pickup. 
In comparison, the Excursion 1-1 HSVs, assigned the explicit purpose of 
PGM delivery, generate a delay of roughly 13 hours, just long enough to load the 
munitions then transit directly at high speed to the customer.  Due to this rapid turn-
around, the HSVs delivered significantly more of the PGM shipments, 174 of the 180 
airlifted.  To best distribute PGMs among the carriers, HSVs alternate PGM deliveries 
among their assigned customers. 
It may be more constructive to examine these same statistics for the 
Excursion 1-2 and Scenario 2, explored later, which, as they stress the model, should 
cause the T-AEs to cycle more often, reducing the delay numbers.  Regardless, the HSVs 
will still perform this niche mission significantly faster than current-day CLF, only the 
scale of the difference may vary.  Table 12 summarizes the results for this scenario. 
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 PGM Theater Delay (Hours) 
 Base Case 
(144 of 180 delivered) 
Excursion 1-1 
(174 of 180 delivered) 
95% CI High 343.00 13.27 
Mean 313.28 12.97 
95% CI Low 283.56 12.67 
Table 12. Scenario 1: Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) in Theater 
Distribution Delay between Base Case and Excursion 1-1 
 
e. Ordnance CONSOLs 
The only remaining interesting point of comparison is the ordnance 
CONSOLs themselves.  Table 13 presents numbers of ordnance CONSOLs and quantity 
of ordnance transferred by each T-AE and HSV for both cases.  In Excursion 1-1, when 
HSVs were also operating, the T-AEs as a group performed nearly 40% fewer 
CONSOLs.  This reduction in T-AE demand resulted from the two HSVs delivering more 
than half of the total ordnance tonnage.  While, individually, the HSV carrying capacity 
is a small fraction of the T-AEs, their high speed in this Korea MCO scenario created 
“virtual capacity”.  It is important to point out that HSVs only load general ordnance to 
fill remaining cargo capacity after loading any required PGM shipments.  If PGM 
shipments are bigger, or arrive more often, this could reduce the general ordnance 
carrying capacity of the HSVs, producing performance different from this case. 
Also in Excursion 1-1, Kilauea (T-AE 26), originally added to make the 
base case feasible, performed zero CONSOLs.  Apparently, the availability of two HSVs 
also rectified the scheduling issues that prevented the original two T-AEs from attaining a 
feasible schedule.  Additionally the total number of T-AE CONSOLs appears within the 
capability of a single T-AE.  This is motivation for performing Excursion 1-2, which will 





 Ordnance CONSOLs 
 Base Case Excursion 1-1 
T-AEs Events Tonnage(stons) Events Tonnage (stons) 
Kilauea (T-AE 26) 2 4,581 0 0 
Shasta (T-AE 33) 8 18,149 5 8,750 
Kiska (T-AE 35) 3 7,027 3 4,641 
TOTAL 13 29,757 8 13,391 
HSVs     
HSV 1 - - 15 6,737 
HSV 2 - - 22 8,565 
TOTAL - - 37 15,302 
Table 13. Scenario 1: Ordnance CONSOLs between Base Case and Excursion 
1-1 
 
3. Excursion 1-2: Reduced Current CLF plus Two HSVs 
This excursion tests the limits of the benefits gained from the two HSVs.  
Excursion 1-2 starts with the force structure from Excursion 1-1 and reduces the CLF 
shuttles ships to the minimum level below which serious sustainment issues appear.  
Based on the results from the Excursion 1, the force levels can be reduced to zero T-
AFSs, and one T-AE, with T-AOs unchanged.  The following sub-sections present the 
results of Excursion 1-2 as compared to the Base Case.  Theater Customer Wait Time 
remains uninteresting due to the Korea MCO scenario and is excluded.  PGM Theater 
Delay and Inter-CONSOL times, heavily dependent on the unchanged HSVs, end up 
identical to Excursion 1-1, so are also excluded. 
 
a. Commodity Load Percentages 
The analysis of this excursion presents only Ordnance Load Percentages, 
as Stores Load Percentages are identical to Excursion 1-1 where T-AFSs are not required.  
Figures 18-22 present the ordnance percentage for each of the station ships as tracked 
throughout the scenario.  For the first two station ships, Figures 18 & 19, the ordnance 
percentage for the Base Case averages much lower than the Excursion case and with 
much larger variation.  For the last three station ships, Figures 20-22, the difference 
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between the cases is much less pronounced.  The Base Case shows 13 total reserve 
violations, distributed evenly among the station ships.  Excursion 1-2 shows six 
violations, all from the last three station ships. 
What is the obvious operational difference between the first two station 
ships and the last three?  The first two station ships are operating with CSGs in the Sea of 
Japan (East Sea) and HSV2 is dedicated to service them.  The last three station ships 
operate with CSGs in the Yellow Sea (West Sea) and HSV1 is dedicated to service them.  
HSV1 is therefore servicing more customers, so each will receive fewer hits.  
Aggravating this situation, 40nm separates the operating areas of HSV1’s three station 
ships, causing additional transit time for multiple CSG hits in a single run.  These 
different examples show the effect of many HSV hits (the first two) compared to few 
HSV hits (the last three).  Station ships that receive many HSV hits have a completely 
altered supply profile, with significantly higher mean commodity levels and significantly 
reduced variation.  Those that receive few HSV hits, only benefit from a reduction in the 
downward slope of their ordnance consumption, increasing the period of their potential 
reserve violations.  Station Ship 4, in Figure 21, is the most extreme example of limited 
HSV hits, with no reduced slope, only a single positive shift in the curve. 
In general, all of the Excursion 1-2 ordnance levels are operationally 
acceptable.  This indicates that in the small Korea Theater with a nearby FLS only, two 
HSVs can act in place of two AEs. 


























Figure 18.   Scenario 1: Station Ship 1 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 1-2 
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Figure 19.   Scenario 1: Station Ship 2 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 1-2 


























Figure 20.   Scenario 1: Station Ship 3 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 1-2 


























Figure 21.   Scenario 1: Station Ship 4 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 1-2 
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Figure 22.   Scenario 1: Station Ship 5 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 1-2 
 
b. Ordnance CONSOLs 
Table 13 presents numbers of ordnance CONSOLs by each T-AE or HSV 
and total ordnance transferred for the base case and this reduced CLF excursion.  This 
data combined with the ordnance commodity percentages for the station ships shows 
clearly that in this Korea MCO scenario only, two HSVs are able to fully substitute for 
two T-AEs.  In fact, the ordnance tonnage moved by the two lost T-AEs in the base case 
is almost completely picked up by the two HSVs.  It is very important to emphasize that 
the “two HSVs equals two T-AEs” result is only known to be applicable in the small 
Korea MCO Theater for this specific scenario.  Any increase in customer ships or 
distances (with the coinciding reduction in HSV cargo capacity), could modify this 
finding.  Scenario 2, with the FLS in Guam, presented next, will provide further 








 Ordnance CONSOLs 
 Base Case Excursion 1-2 
T-AEs Events Tonnage(stons) Events Tonnage (stons) 
Kilauea (T-AE 26) 2 4,581 - - 
Shasta (T-AE 33) 8 18,149 8 13,777 
Kiska (T-AE 35) 3 7,027 - - 
TOTAL 13 29,757 8 13,777 
HSVs     
HSV 1 - - 15 6,737 
HSV 2 - - 22 8,565 
TOTAL - - 37 15,302 
Table 14. Scenario 1: Ordnance CONSOLs between Base Case and Excursion 
1-2 
 
B. KOREA MCO SCENARIO 2: FLS GUAM 
 
1. Base Case: Current CLF Only 
Development of the Scenario 2 Base Case also required several successive 
CLFSAT runs to determine the numbers and types of CLF required for feasibility.  The 
scenario builds on the Scenario 1 Base Case, with no changes to the naval operations of 
the customer ships and starts with the same CLF shuttle ships that were determined 
sufficient in the Scenario 1.  Loss of support from Japan is simulated by removing the 
ports at Sasebo, Yokosuka, Iwakuni, and Okinawa from CLFSAT and changing the FLS 
from Sasebo to Guam.  The iterative process of CLFSAT run, evaluation of MOEs, and 
augmentation of the CLF force structure continues until all customer ships can be 
sustained and are able to conduct all scripted scenario operations.  Actual alterations to 
the CLF force structure involved shifting the assigned CLF shuttles within the theater and 
augmenting additional T-AOs from outside the theater.  The final Base Case shuttle CLF 
force structure is twelve T-AOs, three T-AEs, and three T-AFSs. 
Twelve T-AOs intuitively seems too many, given MSC only operates 13 with 
another in reserve.  This is easily explained when the scenario is examined in detail.  The 
mutually exclusive operating areas (Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan), each at 1800+nm 
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distance from the FLS and with 750nm between them, make it impossible for one CLF 
shuttle ship to service both areas in a short period.  The distance also causes a 
significantly longer cycle time than Scenario 1, so that when a CLF shuttle ship reaches 
the operating area, it is likely to transfer its entire commodity load to one CLF station 
ship.  This also makes it unable to service another customer within the same operating 
area before returning to port for replenishment.  The combination of these factors 
effectively doubles replenishment requirements.  A fully optimized schedule with no 
slack could potentially reduce this requirement to roughly ten T-AOs, and combining all 
five CSGs into one operating area could reduce it further.  The requirement for three T-
AEs supports a rough doubling of the ordnance replenishment requirement, over 1-2 T-
AEs actually required in the Scenario 1 Base Case.  As in Scenario 1, the 3 T-AFSs are 
technically not required, but are included for tradition. 
Given this process, the resulting Scenario 2 Base Case assumes supportability of 
the scripted naval operations, so analysis within that one case is not relevant.  The 
analysis is only valid when comparing MOEs across cases, which vary CLF force 
structure within the same scenario.  To this end, the results for the Scenario 2 Base Case 
are presented where relevant in comparison with the following excursions. 
 
2. Excursion 2-1: Current CLF plus Two HSVs 
This excursion tests whether the benefits gained by adding HSVs in Scenario 1 
also apply at greater distances.  These greater distances thus reduce HSV cargo capacity 
due to having to devote more deadweight to fuel.  The following sub-sections present the 
Scenario 2 Base Case as compared with Excursion 2-1 and in some cases, data from 
Scenario 1.  This analysis uses all MOEs as the increase in transit distances changes the 
scenario significantly. 
 
a. Commodity Load Percentages 
Examining the commodity load percentages over time should show the 
effects of long CLF shuttle cycle times and indicate whether HSVs play any role in 
reducing those effects.  Figures 23-27 present the ordnance percentage for each of the 
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station ships as tracked throughout Scenario 2.  As expected, these look much worse 
overall than Scenario 1.  The ordnance percentage for the Base Case averaged only 
slightly lower overall than Excursion 2-1 and variation was very similar.  For the most 
part, HSV hits only reduced the downward slope of ordnance consumption slightly or 
shifted reserve violations to the right.  Station ship 1 received the most HSV hits and 
consequently performed the best.  The Base Case shows eleven total reserve violations, 
distributed evenly among the station ships and of much longer duration than in Scenario 
1.  Excursion 2-1 shows ten total violations, the majority from the last three ships (those 
on station in the Yellow Sea).  It is important to note that these reserve violations and 
outages were experienced only on the station ships; their assigned carriers maintained 
sufficient ordnance to conduct all required operations. 
Overall, the effect of the HSVs on ordnance levels in Scenario 2 was 
significantly less than in Scenario 1.  This is a combined factor of halved cargo capacity 
and quadrupled transit time.  Doubling the number of HSVs available, as was required for 
the other CLF shuttles would seem reasonable and may improve performance. 


























Figure 23.   Scenario 2: Station Ship 1 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 2-1 
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Figure 24.   Scenario 2: Station Ship 2 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 2-1 


























Figure 25.   Scenario 2: Station Ship 3 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 2-1 


























Figure 26.   Scenario 2: Station Ship 4 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 2-1 
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Figure 27.   Scenario 2: Station Ship 5 Ordnance Percentage between Base Case 
and Excursion 2-1 
 
Figure 28 presents the stores percentages for the Station Ship 1.  This 
graph is again on the same scale, so it is obvious that even in Scenario 2, levels of stores 
are never a sustainment issue.  As in Scenario 1, the T-AFS Combat Stores ships never 
leave port, as there is never a danger of customer ships depleting the stores stocks 
maintained on the station ships sufficiently to cause a pure stores CONSOL.  Again, the 
periodic small stores increases seen in Figure 28 are all attributable to the AO deck load 
items in the Base Case, and a combination of the AO deckload with small HSV hits in the 
excursion.  The unfortunate aspect of this lack of T-AFS cycling is that it removes an 
additional method for high priority CASREP parts distribution to customers.  As before, 
the Base Case stores level percentage does stay lower with more variability (µ = 0.89, σ = 
0.08), while Excursion 2-1 exhibits a higher mean and slightly less variability (µ = 0.93, 
σ = 0.07).  Given the range of the data, the differences are insignificant from a 
sustainment standpoint. 
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Figure 28.   Scenario 2: Station Ship 1 Stores Percentage between Base Case and 
Excursion 2-1 
 
b. Station Ship Inter-CONSOL Times 
Figure 29 presents Station Ship 1’s inter-CONSOL times throughout the 
duration of Scenario 2.  As in Scenario 1, the Base Case inter-CONSOL time remains 
high early in the simulation while the ships of the CSG deplete initially full stocks.  After 
the first 35 days, it appears to stabilize around three days between CONSOLs.  The curve 
for Excursion 2-1 is dramatically different initially, with hits every 4-6 days, but 
stabilizes between two to four days after the first month, much like the Base Case.  
Unlike Scenario 1, a faster turn-around does not seem possible in this more strenuous 
scenario.  Overall, this MOE shows that HSVs still allow more frequent hits for the 
station ships, but the effectiveness of these hits is indicated by other MOEs. 




























Figure 29.   Scenario 2: Station Ship 1 Inter-CONSOL Times between Base Case 
and Excursion 2-1 
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c. Theater Customer Wait Time (CWT) 
Scenario 2, with the FLS outside COD range, allows Theater CWT for 
CASREP high-priority material to differ between the Base Case and Excursion 2-1.  The 
comparison is presented in Table 15.  The results clearly indicate the HSVs in the 
excursion produce a significant reduction in the delay time; in fact, the HSVs deliver the 
material four times faster than the standard CLF shuttle ships.  This positive result 
partially counteracts the lack of benefit gained for ordnance levels due to the less frequent 
and smaller cargo capacity HSV hits imposed by the long transit distances in this 
scenario. 
 
 CASREP Requisition Theater Delay (Hours) 
 Guam Base Case Excursion 2-1 
95% CI High 573.97 137.16 
Mean 469.60 129.17 
95% CI Low 365.23 121.19 
Table 15. Scenario 2: CASREP Requisition in Theater Distribution Delay 
between Base Case and Excursion 2-1 
 
d. Theater Delays for PGM Delivery 
The in-theater portion of delay time in the distribution of critical PGMs 
also differs significantly between the Base Case and this excursion.  For Scenario 2, this 
delay is the time between PGM arrival via airlift at the FLS in Guam and their delivery to 
the aircraft carriers.  The results are summarized in Table 16.  In the Base Case, the three 
T-AEs distribute PGMs as part of their normal demand-based shuttle cycling, with a 
delay typically greater than 17 days.  Additionally, the T-AEs are only able to deliver 126 
of the 180 specific PGM shipments airlifted during the 60-day run of the scenario, with 
remainder still at the FLS awaiting pickup. 
The Excursion 2-1 HSVs perform significantly faster, generating a delay 
of roughly 4 days.  Again, as in Scenario 1, due to this rapid turn-around, the HSVs 
delivered significantly more of the PGM shipments, 162 of the 180 airlifted.  These 
deliveries were distributed evenly among the CSGs.  This finding directly reinforces a 
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similar finding for Scenario 1.  Even in this much more stressed scenario, HSVs are able 
to provide a four-fold improvement in speed of PGM distribution. 
 
 PGM Theater Delay (Hours) 
 Guam Base Case 
(126 of 180 delivered) 
Excursion 2-1 
(162 of 180 delivered) 
95% CI High 466.00 106.60 
Mean 428.35 96.28 
95% CI Low 390.70 85.97 
Table 16. Scenario 2: Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) in Theater 
Distribution Delay between Base Case and Excursion 2-1 
 
e. Ordnance CONSOLs 
As expected from the earlier analysis of the ordnance level percentages, 
the HSVs of this excursion show little impact overall on ordnance CONSOLs.  Table 17 
presents numbers of ordnance CONSOLs and quantity of ordnance transferred by each T-
AE and HSV for both cases of Scenario 2.  In Scenario 1, the HSVs were able to reduce 
T-AE CONSOL requirements by 40% and provided more than half the total ordnance 
tonnage.  In Scenario 2, the HSVs produced no reduction in T-AE CONSOL 
requirements and moved only 17% of the total ordnance tonnage.  The small cargo 
capacity of the HSVs operating at long range negated much of the “virtual capacity” 
effects seen in Scenario 1.  Several factors combine to limit the HSV benefit in this 
scenario.  In addition to the reduction in the HSV’s total cargo capacity, the longer cycle 
times allow more PGMs to build-up at the FLS for HSV distribution.  When this greater 
quantity of higher priority PGMs is loaded on the HSV, there is little, if any, capacity left 






 Ordnance CONSOLs 
 Guam Base Case Excursion 2-1 
T-AEs Events Tonnage(stons) Events Tonnage (stons) 
Kilauea (T-AE 26) 3 7,261 3 6,583 
Shasta (T-AE 33) 6 12,693 6 11,987 
Kiska (T-AE 35) 3 6,842 3 5,931 
TOTAL 12 26,796 12 24,501 
HSVs     
HSV 1 - - 11 2,633 
HSV 2 - - 10 2,602 
TOTAL - - 21 5,235 





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
HSVs are effective logistics platforms in specific scenarios with limited tasks.  
This thesis has attempted to better define and narrow the boundaries on the region of 
HSV logistics effectiveness.  The analysis indicates the general areas of potential HSV 
effectiveness are the same as initially expected: high priority material, ordnance, and 
stores.  These are either required less often and in smaller quantities than other 
commodities, or have a time component that drives the need for rapid delivery.  Also as 
expected, the HSVs can be highly effective in small theaters with short transit distances, 
but for larger theaters, their effectiveness is inversely proportional to the distance from 
the Forward Logistics Site (FLS). 
The niche mission where HSVs appear to be most effective is theater distribution 
of “low density, high priority” cargo; whether that cargo is precision guided munitions 
(PGMs), critical repair parts, or people should not matter.  This holds true in small 
theaters (e.g., Korea or the Arabian Gulf), where specifically tasked HSVs can deliver the 
“low density, high priority” material up to ten times faster than current CLF, and in larger 
theaters, where up to four times faster is still possible.  This area of “customer service”, 
of the most concern to COMLOGWESTPAC, is also the area that shows the most benefit 
from HSVs.  The improvements gained from HSVs should be the most apparent for 
cargos too large for COD, distances greater than COD range, or for ships not operating 
with a CSG. 
The single most effective implementation of this “low density, high priority” 
mission is use of HSVs for combat delivery of critical stocks of limited supply PGMs to 
the aircraft carriers.  As PGMs continue to become more expensive and/or incorporate the 
absolute latest technology, fewer can be procured and staged forward.  Additionally, as 
current military operations consume PGMs rapidly, the Navy could expend all ready 
stocks and be forced to rely on currently open production lines or limited CONUS stocks, 
meaning fewer weapons available worldwide.  Using HSVs as a rapid distribution 
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medium permits possible paradigm shifts in how the Navy procures and stockpiles 
precision weaponry.  Further analysis of centrally stocked, rapid distribution of PGMs 
must be performed to determine if the Navy can gain large efficiencies in PGM supply 
with no loss of tactical effectiveness.  This, of course, relies on many factors other than 
HSVs, the most critical of which is dedicated and reliable military airlift sorties 
supporting Navy ordnance, which would be difficult to obtain. 
 In small theaters with a nearby FLS, such as around Korea, in the Arabian Gulf, 
or within the Mediterranean, HSVs have additional capabilities.  Not only do HSVs allow 
the naval logistics system to “touch” each customer every 36-48 hours, but their speed 
also gives them “virtual capacity”, allowing them to replace some larger current CLF 
shuttle ships.  Specifically, HSVs can act in place of, or in augmentation to, ammunitions 
ships (T-AEs or T-AKEs).  Their ability to do so will vary with the nature of the theater, 
but in small theaters, ratios should range from one to two HSVs for each T-AE replaced.  
It is critical to note that this capability evaporates with distance from the FLS.  At some 
distance particular to the theater and operations, the “virtual capacity” will fall below the 
quantity that is sufficient to sustain the combat forces because the hits simply are not 
large enough.  A recent Fleet Forces Command (FFC) study indicated that a much larger 
HSV to T-AKE replacement ratio was appropriate.  FFC’s assumption of longer HSV 
load times and extension of this ratio outside small theaters drives their larger ratio.  In 
fact, the results from Scenario 2 of this analysis, indicating poor HSV ordnance resupply 
performance at 1800nm ranges, might call into question the validity of any reasonable 
HSV to T-AKE replacement ratio for long ranges. 
Low requirements for stores replenishment drives little to no demand for the 
services of the combat stores ships (T-AFSs).  Given these low stores requirements, HSV 
cargo capacity dedicated to stores combined with oiler (T-AO) stores deck loads should 
be sufficient to sustain customer ships in a wide variety of scenarios.  Dedicating some 
HSVs to covering the stores missions could allow dedication of the new T-AKEs to 
ordnance replenishments, thus potentially reducing the total number required. 
The long-distance FLS scenario identified serious stresses on the ability of the 
naval logistics system to sustain operations around Korea.  While the distance alone 
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caused much of the difficulties, the hypothetical use of two operations areas on opposite 
sides of the Korean peninsula effectively doubled the CLF shuttle requirements.  In the 
event that, in any scenario, the Navy is forced to fall back on distant FLSs for support, 
consideration must be given to simplifying and consolidating naval operations in one 
area, as the CLF is sized based on the assumption of closer FLSs. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
There is extensive potential for further work with CLFSAT.  Even within the 
Korea MCO scenarios, there are additional questions that could be answered.  Given 
more time, many of these cases would have been presented here.  Suggestions for 
additional analysis include HSV ability to service independent groups with no CLF 
station ships (ESGs, SSGs, or independent ships), further investigation of the limitations 
of HSV ability to replace T-AEs or T-AKEs, an effort to force T-AFS or T-AKE cycling 
in CLFSAT to better represent current operations, and an investigation into the effects of 
sea state on HSV logistics support as compared to standard CLF shuttle ships.  CLFSAT 
is also envisioned as a general purpose analysis tool for naval logistics and has been 
written to support this.  Additional refinements and tweaking of algorithms is required to 
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